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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS,
TRUSTS, ESTATES AND PARTNERSHIPS
WILLIAM AND MARY TAX INSTITUTE - 1993
MEADE EMORY
LANE POWE.L SPEARS LUBERSKY
SEATMlE
I. Accounting
A. Accounting Methods
1. Rev. Procs. 92-74 and 92-75, 1992-38 I.R.B. 16 and 22, modifying and
superseding Rev. Procs. 85-36 and 85-37, 1985-2 C.B. 434 and 438.
Exclusive procedures for taxpayers to obtain expeditious consent to change
method of accounting to an accrual method for: (1) taxpayers required to
use inventories in order to clearly reflect income, and (2) other taxpayers,
respectively.
2. Multi-year warranty contracts
a. Announcement 92-93, 1992-27 I.R.B. 13 (6/17/92). The IRS
plans to issue a revenue procedure to allow taxpayers to change
their method of accounting for multi-year insurance policies
purchased in connection with the sale of multi-year motor vehicle
service warranties, to allow amortizing the cost of the policies over
the term of the policies.
b. Announcement 92-127, 1992-38 I.R.B. 41. IRS settlement offer
to automobile dealers on the method of accounting for extended
service warranties issued in connection with motor vehicle sales.
C. Rev. Proc. 92-98, 1992-48 I.R.B. 10 (11/13/92). Procedures by
which accrual method automobile (and other consumer durable
good) manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers may, in certain
specified and limited circumstances, include a portion of an
advance payment related to the sale of a multi-year service
warranty contract in gross income over the life of the service
warranty obligation. See Rev. Proc. 92-97, 1992-48 I.R.B. 7
(11/13/92) (procedures for changing method of accounting for
costs of multi-year insurance policies purchased in conjunction
with the sale of such warranties to customers).
3. Rev. Rul. 92-65, 1992-35 I.R.B. 6 (8/12/92), modifying Rev. Rul. 91-30,
1991-1 C.B. 61. The portion of Rev. Rul. 91-30 that holds a personal
service corporation that performs veterinary services to be performing
§ 448 "health" services and requires it (a) under § 11(b)(2) to use the 34%
tax rate and (b)under § 441(i) to use the calendar year, will not be applied
to taxable years beginning prior to 5/13/91 (with additional time for
meeting the calendar year requirement).
B. Inventories
1. Rev. Proc. 92-79, 1992-39 I.R.B. 13; "Alternative LIFO Method" for
automobile dealers, which is a comprehensive dollar-value, link-chain
LIFO method that encompasses several LIFO sub-methods. The revenue
procedure contains a 14-step simplified computational methodology.
C. Installment Method
1. Applefate v. Commissioner, 980 F.2d 1125, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50, 623
(7th Cir. 12/7/92). Taxpayer (landlord farmer) was entitled to report the
sale of grain crop share rentals to a grain elevator pursuant to "price later"
contracts under the installment method. These contracts did not specify a
purchase price, but the sellers (taxpayers) could "demand" at any time
within one year that the buyer pay its "regular bid price" in effect on the
demand date. The court held these contracts not to be § 453(f)(4)(A)
evidences of indebtedness "payable on demand" because the "demand" had
the function not only of triggering the buyer's obligation to pay, but also
of establishing the price. The seller's "valuable right" to wait until he
believes the price is best before making demand differentiates these "price
later" contracts from the "payable on demand" options of an obligee to
require immediate payment of an amount specified in (or computable
from) the terms of the instrument.
2. Frane v. Commissioner, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,386 (8th Cir. 7/6/93, ffg
and rev'g 98 T.C. 341 (1992). The automatic cancellation of an
installment obligation between related parties at the death of the obligee
[the "self-canceling installment note or the "death-terminating installment
note"] results in gain recognition under §453B equal to the difference
between the basis of the obligation and its face value. The cancellation
is treated as a "transmission of installment obligations at death" under
§453B(c), not as a §453B(f) "disposition," so the gain is treated as §691
income in respect of a decedent and taxed to the estate, under
§§691(a)(5)(iii) and 691(a)(2). (The Ulx Court had held the gain to be
includible in the decedent's last tax return.)
D. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. T.D. 8459, final regulations under §468B, relating to the tax treatment of
transfers to settlement funds, as well as income earned, and distributions
made, by such funds (12/18/92). A qualified settlement fund is
(1) established or approved by a governmental authority (including an
agency or court), (2) established to resolve claims under CERCLA, tort,
contract breach, law violation or otherwise designated by Commissioner,
and (3) a trust under state law or segregated from other assets of the
transferor. Note that both designated and qualified settlement funds are
currently taxed on income at the maximum §1(e) rate in effect for the
year, now 39.6%.
2. Rev. Proc. 93-34, 1993-28 I.R.B. (8/10/93). Provides rules under which
a §468B(d)(2) designated settlement fund or a Reg. §1.468B-1 qualified
settlement fund will be considered "a party to the suit or agreement" for
purposes of the §130 exclusion by an assignee from gross income of
amount it receives (for assuming the liability of a party to the suit or
agreement to make described periodic payments of damages to a
claimant).
3. Rev. Rul. 92-51, 1992-27 I.R.B. 9 (6/12/92), rendering obsolete Rev.
Ruls. 71-119 [1971-1 C.B. 163], 70-567 [1970-2 C.B. 133], and 64-131
(third fact situation) [1964-1 C.B. 485]. This ruling applies § 468B(g),
which provides that nothing in any provision of law shall be construed as
providing that an escrow account, settlement fund, or similar fund is not
subject to current income tax.
4. Roanoke Gas Co. v. United States, 977 F.2d 131, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,
496 (4th Cir. 10/1/92). Utility company's obligation to reduce its rates
through a future rate adjustment, even if imposed to account for past
overcharges, relates merely to future income, and was not a liability
giving rise to an immediately deductible expense. The court rejected
taxpayer's argument that an immediate tax deduction was proper because
it was based upon the regulator's order requiring refunds, which refunds
were (for financial accounting purposes) immediately deductible from
income.
5. Southwestern Enery Co. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 32 (6/1/93).
Follows Roanoke Gas Co. v. United States, 977 F.2d 131, 92-2 U.S.T.C.
50,496 (4th Cir. 1992), in holding that utility's obligation to reduce
rates through a future rate reduction was not a liability that gives rise to
an immediately deductible expense.
II. Business Income and Deductions
A. Depreciation, Depletion and Credits
1. Intanibles
a. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555,
91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,451 (3d Cir. 9/12/91), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 1583 (4/6/92), rev'g and remanding 734 F. Supp. 176, 90-1
U.S.T.C. 50,193 (D. N.J. 1990). Depreciation taken on the
intangible asset "paid subscribers," which arose from existing
subscriber relationships with 460,000 at-will subscribers, to which
$67 million of the $328 million adjusted tax basis was allocated (in
a former §§ 332-334(b)(2) liquidation in 1977) was denied because
the taxpayer could not demonstrate that the value of the paid
subscribers was "separate and distinct from goodwill" on the
ground that at-will subscribers (as distinct from contractually-
bound subscribers) give rise to a mere "expectation of continued
patronage," which is the essence of goodwill. The court refused to
follow Colorado National Bankshares. Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1990 - 495, because it and other cases "represent no more
than a minority strand amid the phalanx of cases . . . which
support the Service's position." The Third Circuit also rejected
valuation of customer lists based on the stream of income to be
generated in future years; the cost basis value of the customer lists
was roughly $3 million as opposed to the $67 million value of the
income stream.
b. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C,
50,228 (U.S. 4/20/93) (5-4), rev'g and remanding 945 F.2d 555,
91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,451 (3d Cir. 1991). Justice Blaclnun held
that "paid subscribers" [going beyond a mere list of customers]
was an intangible asset having an ascertainable value and a limited
useful life (the duration of which can be ascertained with
reasonable accuracy) and, therefore, was depreciable. The Court
rejected the IRS argument that the asset "paid subscribers" was
part of goodwill as a matter of law. The Court found the issue of
separability from goodwill to be a question of fact, i.e., whether
the asset is capable of being valued and whether that value
diminishes over time, and on this issue the Government presented
no evidence to refute taxpayer's methodology. The Court rejected
the Government's suggestion that the $67.8 million allocated to
this asset was overstated (and that a $3 million subscription drive
could generate the same number of subscribers). Justice Souter in
dissent held the asset to be one of "the expectancy of continued
patronage" from existing customers, which is part of the definition
of goodwill.
C. 1993 Act §13261 provides 15-year amortization under new Code
§197 for intangibles acquired after 8/10/93 and held in connection
with a trade or business or income producing activity ("section 197
intangibles"). Statute contains election to apply to property
acquired after 7/25/91. Section 197 intangibles include goodwill
and franchises, as well as covenants not to compete entered into in
connection with the acquisition of a trade or business; however,
the current §162 deduction treatment under §1253(d(l) of
contingent amounts paid for franchises is not affected.
d. Canterbury v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 12 (8/17/92).
Taxpayers acquired a number of McDonald's franchises, each by
purchase of an existing McDonald's restaurant operation for a
purchase price in excess of the value of tangible assets. The Tax
Court rejected Commissioner's determination that the portion of
each such excess allocable to § 1253 amortizable franchise fees
should be limited to the amount charged by the franchisor to the
original franchisee [$950 until 1960, $12,500 between 1960 and
1987, and $22,500 since 1987]. All intangible assets acquired,
including goodwill (except for a relatively small allocation to
going-concern value), were found to inhere in the franchise.
e. Colorado National Bankshares. Inc. v. Commissioner, 93-1
U.S.T.C. 50,077 (10th Cir. 1/25/93) afg T.C. Memo.
1990-495. Taxpayer was permitted to amortize "core deposits" of
acquired banks because they were separable from good will and
taxpayer demonstrated that they had value and a limited useful life.
f. Jefferson-Pilot Col'. v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,348
(4th Cir. 6/14/93), affg 98 T.C. 435 (1992). FCC licenses are
within the § 1253 definition of "franchise" which, in § 1253(b)(1),
includes both commercial franchises and government grants of
licenses.
g. Stokely USA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No.29 (5/24/93).
lhxpayer allowed §1253 amortization on the "Stokely" trademark
it purchased for a lump-sum payment because the transferor
retained the significant right to prevent taxpayer's use of the
trademark in connection with pork and beans for 20 years.
2. AMT Preference for Excess Percentage Depletion
a. United States v. Hill, 113 S. Ct. 941, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,037
(U.S. 1/25/93) (9-0), ryg 945 F.2d 1529, 91-2 U.S.T.C.
50,475 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In computing the § 57(a)(8) item of
AMT tax preference for the excess of percentage depletion over
the adjusted basis of the property, the adjusted basis does not
include the unrecovered costs of depreciable tangible items used to
exploit the mineral deposits. Judge Souter, speaking for the Court,
used the analogy of an apartment building and the land it sits on
to show that the mineral property and the depreciable tangible
property are separate assets for § 1016 purposes.
b. The Comprehensive National Enery Policy Act of 1992 (Pub.
L. No. 102-486) repeals the excess percentage depletion AMT
preference for oil and gas and limits the excess intangible drilling
costs AMT preference. Act § 1915, Code § 57(a)(1) and (2).
3. Rev. Rul. 92-72, 1992-37 I.R.B. 5. Circumstances under which a
taxpayer is not considered to be selling oil or natural gas through a related
retailer, and therefore would not be considered a retailer itself for
§ 613A(d)(2) percentage depletion purposes.
4. T.D. 8437, final regulations under § 613A, clarifying the circumstances
under which percentage depletion is available in the case of oil and gas
wells (9/22/92).
5. Rev. Rul. 93-26, 1993-15 I.R.B. 5. An integrated oil company that has
begun under § 291(b) to amortize 30% of its IDC over a 60-month period
must continue to amortize any undeducted IDC even though it ceases to
be an integrated oil company. Should the integrated oil company dispose
of such property during the 60-month amortization period, the
unamortized portion of the IDC amount is included in basis for
determining gain or loss upon the disposition and is not subject to
continued amortization.
6. Nalle v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 9 (8/5/92), rev'd, 93-2 U.S.T.C.
50,468 (5th Cir. 8/16/93). Tax Court: ITC claimed on rehabilitated
buildings was disallowed because, prior to the start of the rehabilitation
process, the eight buildings were relocated from various cities in Texas to
a business park in Austin -- even though 75 % or more of the existing
exterior walls were "retained"-- because § 48(g)(1)(A)(iii) requires the
walls be "retained in place" and subsequently-proposed (and later adopted
as final) Reg. § 1.48-12(b)(5) provides that a relocated building does not
qualify. Fifth Circuit: Rehab. credit under §48(g) [later transferred to
§47(c), and amended] allowed to "qualified rehabilitated [40-year old]
buildings" that had been relocated (by being moved up to 80 miles) to an
office park in Austin, TX. Reg. §1.48-12(b)(5) (disallowing the credit for
relocated buildings) was held to be invalid in that it was not a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory "external wall test" ("75 % or more of the
external walls of [the building] are retained in place as external walls in
the rehabilitative process"). The court also found the retroactive
application of the regulation to be "troubling," and refused to require
taxpayers "to examine the legislative history before relying on the plain-
spoken word of Congress..."
7. Pacific Enterprises v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. (7/12/93). MIxpayer's
reclassification of an amount of "working gas" (inventory) as "cushion
gas" constituted an impermissible change of accounting method (which
would have resulted in deferring $26 million of income until abandonment
of the reservoir), which Commissioner disallowed under §446(e) because
approval was not requested. "Cushion gas" (for reservoirs) and "line pack
gas" (for pipelines) are capital assets, not FIFO inventory as IRS
contended. The volume of nonreversible cushion gas was determined,
based upon "economic recoverability" (as opposed to "physical
recoverability"), and this nonrecoverable volume is subject to
depreciation.
8. Proposed regulations (PS-55-89) under § 168(i)(4), relating to MACRS
election to group assets in one or more general asset accounts (F.R.
8/31/92).
9. T.D. 8455, final regulations under § 179, relating to the election to
expense depreciable business assets (12/23/92).
10. PS-19-92, proposed regulations under § 42, concerning the low-income
housing credit (F.R. 12/29/92).
11. The Comprehensive National Ener= Pblicy Act of 1992 (Pub. IL. No.
102-486) makes permanent the 10% tax credit for business investment in
solar and geothermal energy, but does not extend the § 29 tax credit for
non-conventional fuels. Act §§ 1916, 1918.
12. 1993 Act §13131 expands and simplifies Code §32 earned income tax
credit, effective 1/1/94.
13. 1993 Act §13151 increases the Code §168 recovery period for
nonresidential real property from 31.5 years to 39 years, effective for
property placed in service after 5/13/93.
14. 1993 Act §13443 adds new Code §45B which gives restaurant owners a
tax credit to offset the cost of paying the 7.65% FICA tax on tips received
by servers, effective for taxes paid after 1993.
15. 1993 Act §13111 extends the §41 credit R&E credit, retroactively
effective for expenditures made between 7/1/92 and 6/30/95.
16. 1993 Act §13012 extends the §51 target jobs credit, effective for targeted
employees who began work after 6/30/92 and on or before 12/31/94.
17. 1993 Act §13142 permanently extends the §42 low-income housing credit,
retroactively to 7/30/92.
18. 1993 Act §13301-4 add new Code §§1391-1397D, which provides tax
incentives for "empowerment zones" and "enterprise communities,"
effective 8/10/93.
B. Expenses
1. Home Office
a. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52,91-1 U.S.T.C. 50,291
(4th Cir. 6/5/91) (2-1), cert. granted 3/23/92, aff a 94 TC. 20
(1990) (reviewed). Anesthesiologist's home office expenses were
deductible under § 280A(c)(1) because the home office was his
"principal place of business" under the Mix Court's new "facts -and
circumstances" test which replaced the "focal point" test. The
taxpayer spent a substantial amount of time in that office
performing essential managerial/administrative functions and there
was no other location available for performance of such functions.
Dissent on the ground taxpayer did not do his most important work
at his home office nor did he spend the majority of his time there,
following lPmarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495, 88-2
U.S.T.C. 9588(9th Cir. 1988).
b. Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701, 93-1 U.S.T.C.
50,014 (U.S. 1/12/93) (8-1), rvg 91-1 U.S.T.C. 50,291 (4th
Cir. 1991). The principal place of business for purposes of the
§ 280A(c)(1)(A) exception to the nondeductibility of home office
expenses is to be determined by "the relative importance of the
activities performed at each business location and the time spent at
each place." An anesthesiologist whose actual treatments were
performed in hospitals, and who spent 30-35 hours per week in
hospitals -- as opposed to 10-15 hours per week at home -- did not
qualify for the exception.
(1) The Court (Kennedy) noted that "the statute does not allow
for a deduction whenever a home office may be
characterized as legitimate." It held that "the point where
goods and services are delivered [i.e., the focal point] must
be given great weight," but that "no one test is
determinative in every case." The Court further held that
the "essentiality" of the functions performed in the home
office should not have "much weight," nor should "the
availability of alternative space" have any bearing
whatsoever on the "principal place of business" inquiry.
(2) Justice Blackmun, concurring, noted that "principal"
compels a comparison, and the bulk of taxpayer's time was
spent in hospitals and the greater part of his remuneration
was earned there.
(3) Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, proposed a
brighter line test, i.e., the "focal point" test, or (as he
would call it) the "place of sale or service" test, with
reversion to a "totality-of-the-circumstances analysis" only
where the home office is one of several locations where
goods or services are delivered."
(4) Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that Congress
intended to allow the deduction to "self-employed taxpayers
who manage their business from a home office," but do not
meet or deal there with patients, clients or customers.
Justice Stevens stated that "the principal office of a self-
employed person's business would seem to me to be the
most typical example" and cited an example contained in
Prop. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), allowing the deduction to
"the outside salesperson who has no office space except at
home and spends a substantial amount of time on
paperwork at home."
c. Notice 93-12, 1993-8 I.R.B. 46 (2/8/93). IRS guidance for home
office deductions in light of the Soliman decision: (1) Proposed
Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3) will be conformed to that decision, i.e.,
outside salesperson who spends 30 hours per week visiting
customers and 12 hours per week working at his home office
cannot deduct expenses for the business use of his home; (2) the
IRS will not challenge 1991 or earlier home office deductions if
they reasonably fell within the pre-Soliman Publication 587
(Business Use of Your Home) discussion or the example at the end
of pre-Soliman proposed regulations; and (3) the IRS will waive
1992 estimated tax penalties to the extent they were attributable to
the loss of home office deductions for which taxpayers would have
qualified under pre-Soliman authority.
2. Capitalization and INDOPCO
a. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-39 I.R.B. 7. The INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,113 (U.S.
2/26/92), decision does not affect the treatment of advertising costs
under § 162(a). "These costs are generally deductible . . . even
though advertising may have some future effect on business
activities, as in the case of institutional or goodwill advertising."
b. TAM 9240004 under 88 263 and 263A (6/29/92). Taxpayer must
capitalize the costs incurred for the removal and replacement of
asbestos insulation on machines because the removal and
replacement made the machines more readily marketable. The
TAM cited the INDOPCO, Inc. case.
c. TAM 9315004 (121/17/92). The costs of an environmental cleanup
of PCB soil contamination were capital expenditures -- rather than
currently deductible business expenses -- because the costs were
significant relative to taxpayer's overall investment and were
incurred under a long-term systematic plan of rehabilitation and
restoration. Capitalized costs may be added to the cost of
depreciable facilities.
d. Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 34
(12/23/92). Deduction of taxpayer target's expenses under § 162
in a successful'takeover was denied and those expenses required to
be capitalized because the takeover was not hostile and it resulted
in long-term benefits to taxpayer. The court followed INDOPCO
because the facts of the two cases are "strikingly similar"; the
court did not address taxpayer's argument that INDOPCO should
be narrowly construed to apply to "friendly" acquisitions only.
e. T.D. 8482, final regulations under §263A, relating to accounting
for costs incurred in producing property and acquiring property for
resale (8/6/93). See, also, IA-64-91, proposed amendments to
§263A regulations, relating to exceptions to the capitalization of
"handling costs" (F.R. 8/9/93).
3. Captive Insurance
a. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 972 E2d 858, 92-2
U.S.T.C. 50,426(7th Cir. 8/18/92), aff'g on this issue 96 T.C.
61 (1991). A trier of fact could have properly concluded that-the
transactions between Sears and Allstate, its wholly-owned
subsidiary -- characterized by the parties as "insurance" -- had
substance as "insurance" independent of tax consequences. The
court rejected the Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941),
definition of insurance ["risk-shifting" and "risk distribution"] in
favor of the test as to whether the transaction "has some substance
independent of tax effects," Judge Easterbrook going on to note
that "it is a blunder to treat a phrase in an opinion as if it were
statutory language." The court noted that corporations do not
insure primarily to shift risks, but "to spread the costs of casualties
over time," particularly in light of the fact that much of the
insurance sold to corporations is experience-rated.
b. AMERCO. Inc. v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 162, 92-2 U.S.T.C.
50,571 (9th Cir. 11/5/92). Parent and subsidiaries can shift risk
to a captive insurer where that insurer has significant unrelated
business (related taxpayers' share of insurer's business was 26%-
48%; unrelated business was 52%-74%). Harper Group v.
Commissioner, 979 F.2d 1341, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 5Q,572 (9th Cir.
11/5/92), follows the AMERCO case despite unrelated business of
only 29% -33 % because it cannot be said ix Court "committed
clear error."
c. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct.
714,92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,018 (Cl. Ct. 12/18/91), aff'd per curiam,
93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,160 (Fed. Cir. 3/9/93). Unrelated business
(44% and 66% during the years in issue) written by a Bermuda
captive insurance company was sufficient to reduce significantly
the risk to which the insured parent was exposed, and thus
transferred the bulk of the risk to the captive insurance company.
Aff'd per curiam, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,160 (Fed. Cir. 3/9/93).
d. Rev. Rul. 92-93, 1992-45 I.R.B. 6, distinguishing Rev. Rul. 77-
316, 1977-2 C.B. 53. Parent corporation may deduct premiums
paid to its insurance company subsidiary for group-term life
insurance on parent's employees under § 162, and the employees
may exclude from gross income under § 79 an amount equal to the
cost of $50,000 of life insurance coverage, because the
arrangement does not involve self-insurance. These holdings also
apply to accident and health insurance.
4. Rev. Proc. 92-56, 1992-28 I.R.B. 7. Administratively continues for
another 18 months (through 1993 for calendar year taxpayers) the
temporary modification of Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3), which allocates R & D
expenditures between U.S. and foreign source income based on sales. The
rules had been modified by legislative enactments between 1981 and
mid-1992.
5. Kliethermes v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 111, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,584
(Fed. Cl. 11/13/92). Uncompensated officer/50% shareholder could not
deduct unreimbursed expenses incurred on behalf of the corporation under
§ 162 because (being unpaid) he was not engaged in a trade or business
and the Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,40-1 U.S.T.C. 9161 (1939),
line of cases holds that a shareholder is not entitled to deduct payments of
corporate expenses.
6. Excess-Parachute Pavrments
a. Poweli v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 6 (2/2/93). Employee
severance payment of $3,475,000 made in May 1985 by corporate
employer to its president/taxpayer (subsequent to a merger
agreement in which corporate employer was acquired) was not an
excess parachute payment (nondeductible under § 280G and subject
to excise tax under § 4999) because the payment was made
pursuant to an employment agreement that was not "entered into,
renewed, or amended in any significant aspect after June 14,
1984." One-half of a stock option cancellation payment of
$1,525,000 was potentially subject to tax as a parachute payment,
but it did not equal or exceed three times taxpayer's base amount
of $309,949.
b. Balch v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 21 (4/12/93). Consulting
contract payments to former senior executives of acquired
corporation constituted § 280G "excess parachute payments" and
are both nondeductible and subject to the § 4999 excise tax. (The
acquisition took place on 6/14/84 and the original severance pay
agreements were entered into on the next day under the mistaken
belief that the effective date for the 1984 Act golden parachute
provision was for agreements entered into after 6/15/84. The
effective date, in reality, was for agreements entered into after
6/14/84, so the severance pay agreements were subject to the
golden parachute provisions. The consulting contracts replaced the
severance pay agreements after the parties learned of their
mistake.)
7. Proposed amendments of regulations (PS-2-89) under § 174, relating to
the definition of "research or experimental expenditures" and the
interpretation of the § 174(e) reasonableness requirement, added in 1989
(F.R. 3/24/93). Withdraws 1989 proposed regulation position that
excludes from the definition of "research or experimental expenditures"
any costs paid or incurred after the "basic design specification" of the
product or property was met (unless for significant design changes)
because the Service responded favorably to arguments that progress is
often achieved in small, incremental steps.
8. Placid Oil Co. v. IRS, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,234 (5th Cir. 4/15/93) rev
and remanding 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,051 (N.D. Thx. 1991). Professional
fees and expenses paid in bankruptcy proceedings should be analyzed
individually to segregate among currently deductible, amortizable and
nonamortizable categories.
9. Rugby Productions Ltd. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 35 (6/14/93).
Personal service corporation owned by Joan Rivers and her late spouse
was denied deductions for the premiums on a disability income insurance
policy on Joan Rivers (but payable to the corporation) because any
proceeds would be tax-exempt under §104(a)(3), and §265(a)(1) denies
deductibility of expenditures paid to recover tax-exempt income.
10. 1993 Act §13209 reduces from 80% to 50% the Code §274(n) allowance
for deduction of meals and entertainment, effective for years beginning
after 1993.
12. 1993 Act §13209 denies deduction of club dues by amending §274(a),
effective for years beginning after 1993.
13. 1993 Act §13272 denies under Code §274(m) any business travel
deduction for spouses and dependents on their nonbusiness travel, for tax
years beginning after 1993.
14. 1993 Act §13222 denies deduction for lobbying expenses by adding new
Code §§170(f)(9) and 6033(e) and amending §162(e), effective for
expenses incurred after 1993. See, Sheppard, "The New Etiquette of
Lobbying," Tax Notes, Aug. 30, 1993, p. 1176; Alexander, "The New
Rules Limiting Deductibility of Lobbying Expenses," Tax Notes,
Sept. 30, 1993, p. 1509.
15. 1993 Act §13116 allows elections under Code §179 to deduct $17,500 of
business investment, effective for property placed in service in tax years
beginning after 1992.
C. Losses and At Risk
1. In re Antonelli, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,619 (Bankr. D. Md. 11/6/92).
Section 469 passive activity losses of an individual debtor in a Chapter 11
proceeding were not among the tax attributes to which the bankruptcy
estate succeeds under § 1398(g), in the absence of regulations that so
provide. But see, IA-5-92, proposed regulations under § 1398 that would
so provide (F.R. 11/9/92).
2. Proposed regulations (IA-5-92) under § 1398, relating to the application
of §§ 469 and 465 to the bankruptcy estates of individuals (F.R. 11/9/92).
These proposed regulations would add § 469 PALs and § 465 at risk
losses to those listed in § 1398(g), under which the estate succeeds to
certain enumerated attributes of the individual bankrupt (which, in turn,
revert to the debtor upon termination of the bankruptcy estate).
Anti-avoidance provisions in Prop. Reg. § 1.469-4(h) permit the IRS to
regroup activities to prevent tax avoidance.
3. Woodall v. Commissioner, 964 F.2d 361, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,363 (5th
Cir. 6/12/92). Claimed § 165 partnership loss deduction of $78,441 on
nightclub fire was reduced to $8,541 because schedule L balance sheet
attached to nightclub's partnership tax return stated that $8,451 was the
adjusted basis of all depreciable partnership assets at the beginning of the
year. Portillo v, Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128, 91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,304
(5th Cir. 1991), distinguished on the ground that the IRS here relied upon
'taxpayer's statement, not another's statement.
4. Black Gold Energy Coro. v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 24(10/15/92).
Accrual basis taxpayer may not claim a § 166 bad debt loss as a
guarantor, based upon its delivery of its own promissory note to the
creditor in settlement of its guarantee obligation. The court follows
Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82,57-1 U.S.T.C. 9200 (1956),
which held the guarantor's loss to arise from the inability of the debtor.to
reimburse the guarantor -- so that the loss cannot arise any earlier than
when the guarantor makes payment to the creditor, Reg. § 1.166-9(a).
5. Litwin v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,041 (10th Cir. 1/9/93).
Taxpayer permitted § 166(a) bad debt deductions for loans and guarantees
of third-party loans to his start-up corporation because his dominant
motivation was not to protect his investment [the loans guaranteed far
exceeded his investment], but to earn a salaried income from the company
[although he deferred his salary for the three years before the corporation
became bankrupt]. United States v. Generes, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 9259 (U.S.
1972), distinguished.
6. Garner v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,167 (5th Cir. 3/23/93).
Corporate officer/sole shareholder failed to prove that his personal
guaranty of more than $1 million of corporate obligations was made for
the dominant motive of protecting his $30,000 to $50,000 salary, as
opposed to protecting his investment in the corporation, so § 166 business
bad debt deductions were disallowed because the bad debt was a
nonbusiness obligation.
7. 1993 Act §13143 provides relief from the Code §469 passive activity loss
rules for real estate professionals, effective for tax years beginning after
1993.
D. Business Income
1. T.D. 8454, final regulations under § 56(g), relating to adjusted current
earnings for AMT purposes (12/18/92).
2. Rev. Rul. 93-16, 1993-8 I.R.B. 5. An FAA project grant to a corporate
public-use airport owner is a § 118 nonshareholder contribution to capital,
and the corporation must reduce the basis of its property under § 362(c)(2)
rules.
3. 1993 Act §13150 provides an election for business debtors to exclude
from gross income under § 108(a) any discharge of "qualified real property
business indebtedness," effective 1/1/93.
4. Worden v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 9/93). An insurance agent is not
taxable on commissions he contractually waived with his client (having
them remit to him, when the policy is first taken out, that amount of the
premium net of his commission). He reported his override commissions
attributable to the policy's renewal. See, Simmons, "bnth Circuit Allows
Waiver of Life Insurance Commission," Tax Notes, Oct. 11, 1993, p.
237.
5. Mark D. Collins, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,486 (2nd Cir. 8/30/93). Ticket
vendor at off-track parlor had gross income when he punched up tickets
to gamble in his own name. Although gambling losses were incurred they
could not offset embezzlement income.
II. Capital Gain and Loss
A. Dial v. Commissioner, 968 F.2d 898, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,364 (9th Cir.
6/30/92). Affirms summary judgment holding treasury bill futures contracts to be
capital assets, even though former 1221(5) [repealed by 1981 EiTA, but in effect
during tax years in question] excepted any "obligation of the United States" from
capital-asset treatment, because the futures contracts are not "hedges." Arkansas
Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212,88-1 U.S.T.C. 9210 (U.S. 1988),
followed.
B. Eck v. Commissioner, 99 T. C. 1 (7/6/92). Christmas tree farmer who sold
individual trees to retail customers [by use of a "Tree Cutting Permit"
arrangement before payment] did not retain an economic interest in the trees
within the meaning of § 631(b) in order to be entitled to capital gains treatment
on the sales; no binding contract was entered into prior to the cutting.
C. Aizawa v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 10 (8/6/92). "Ixpayers owned rental
property with an original cost in 1981 of $120,000 and an adjusted basis of
$100,091.38. The property was subject to a recourse purchase money (seller-
financed) mortgage of $90,000. In 1987, the property was sold by the sellers at
a foreclosure sale for $72,700, and the sellers obtained a deficiency judgment of
$60,800 [$133,500 minus $72,700] against the cash-basis taxpayers. [The
$133,500 consists of $90,000 mortgage principal; $18,000 accrued and unpaid
interest; $25,000 attorney's fees; and $500 court costs.] In view of the clear
separation between the foreclosure sale and the unpaid recourse liability, the
amount realized was equal to the $72.700 proceeds of the foreclosure sale,
resulting in a loss on the sale of $27,391.38, with future payments of principal
nondeductible and any subsequent discharge of the indebtedness treated as income
(to the extent of borrowed funds that have not been repaid). The Commissioner
argued for a loss of $10,091.38, contending that the amount realized was the
$90,000 unpaid mortgage principal; the opinion indicated that this might be
proper where "the unpaid recourse liability for mortgage principal [does not]
survive as part of a deficiency judgment." Thxpayer contended that the $60,800
deficiency judgment should be deducted from the $90,000 mortgage principal to
arrive at an amount realized of $29,200, for a loss of $70,891.38; this has the
defect of not having added the unpaid accrued interest, attorneys fees, and court
costs to unpaid mortgage principal, or (alternatively) of omitting them from the
calculated deficiency judgment.
D. Williford v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1992-450 (8/10/92). Collector/part-time
art dealer who sold eight paintings for a profit of $1,757,875 from his private
collection in two years was entitled to capital gains treatment because he did not
advertise, held the art for several years and devoted minimal time and effort to
the sales. Negligence penalty applied for deducting expenses relating to
taxpayer's investment paintings on his Schedule C.
E. Standley v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 13 (8/18/92). Amounts received
through a "dairy termination program" (in part to compensate farmers who, under
the program, sold dairy herd cows for slaughter) in excess of the fair market
value of cows for dairy purposes are ordinary income, and not § 1231 capital
gains income, because the excess was intended to replace receipts from the milk
production operation. Goodwill with respect to the operation of a dairy farm was
not sold because taxpayer only agreed not to be a dairy farmer for five years.
F. FI-31-92, proposed Regulation § 1.1001-3, relating to the treatment of
modifications of debt instruments as 1001 realization events (F.R. 12/2/92),
subsequent to Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503(1991).
Defines "modification" [ (c)] and provides rules for determination of whether
common types of modifications are significant [ (e)]; only a significant
modification of a debt will be a taxable event, and these include changes in
annual interest rate of more than .25 % and extensions of maturity by five years
or more (or 1/2 of original term, if shorter).
G. TAM 9302001 (8/31/92). Insolvent owners of apartment complex [transferred
to the lender in exchange for cancellation of a nonrecourse debt to which the
property was subject] realized gain in an amount equal to the excess of the
balance of the debt over their adjusted basis in the property. The § 108(a)(l)(B)
insolvency exclusion does not apply to gains from property dispositions.
H. In re Mehr, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,091 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1/28/93). The bankruptcy
estate of individual debtors at least 55 years old could not (under § 121) exclude
$125,000 of gain from the sale of their personal residence owned by the estate.
The estate's succession under § 1398(g) to the tax attributes of the debtor,
including basis, holding period and character of assets (§ 1398(g)(6)), was not
meant to entitle the estate to take the § 121 election on behalf of the debtor.
1. Murphy v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,270 (9th Cir. 5/4/93). Section
1256 mark-to-market provision was held to be constitutional when gains inherent
in commodity futures contract were taxed as if they were sold on the last business
day of the year. The inherent gains were receivable by taxpayer daily, as a
matter of right, under the Reg. § 1.451-2 constructive receipt doctrine.
J. Federal National Mortgage Assn. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 36(6/17/93)
(reviewed, unanimous). Taxpayer's sale and exchange of (1) regulated fixtures
contracts on debt securities, (2) options on such regulated fixtures contracts, and
(3) Treasury securities give rise to ordinary gains and losses because the
transactions constituted hedges [or "microhedges" (which offset the risk that
interest rates would increase -- an event which would reduce taxpayer's
anticipated profit on particular transactions)]. These hedging transactions were
held to be "an integral part of the system by which FNMA purchased and held
mortgages," and were excluded from the definition of "capital asset" by
§ 1221(4); mortgage notes were held by FNMA in the ordinary course of
banking, and the hedging transactions simply dealt with other types of notes
receivable (which acted as surrogates for the mortgage notes and did not have to
be the asset taxpayer intended to acquire). The court held that Corn Product
Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 55-2 U.S.T.C. 9746 (1955), as
interpreted by Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 88-1
U.S.T.C. 9210 (1988), allows for broad interpretations of the five exceptions
under § 1221. See, Sheppard, "'Mhx Court's Fannie Mae Decision Makes the
World Safe for Hedging," Tax Notes, June 28, 1993, p. 1736.
K. 1993 Act prevents conversion of ordinary income to capital gains by adding new
Code §1258, effective for transactions entered into after 4/30/93.
L. 1993 Act §13113 adds new Code §1202 permitting taxpayers (other than C
corporations) to exclude 50% of any gain on "qualified small-business stock" held
for more than 5 years, effective for stock issued after 8/10/93.
M. Stoller v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,349 (D.C. Cir. 6/11/93), aff'g and
r T.C. Memo. 1990-659. Commodities trader's losses resulting from the
"cancellation" of pre-1981 Act forward contracts and their replacement with new
contracts having different delivery dates were ordinary losses, and not capital
losses (as the ix Court had found where a futures contract was closed by
offsetting an opposite (buy/sell) contract because then the contract had been "sold
or exchanged").
VI. Exempt Organizations and Charitable Giving
A. Proposed amendments to regulations (EE-70-91) under § 512(b)(1), relating to
the exclusion from unrelated business taxable income of income from interest rate
swaps and currency swaps because it is "substantially similar [to] income from
ordinary and routine investments in connection with a securities portfolio"
(9/4/91). T.D. 8423, final regulations (F.R. 7/29/92).
B. EE-74-92, proposed regulations under §§ 512 and 513, relating to whether
sponsorship payments received by exempt organizations are unrelated business
taxable income (F.R. 1/22/93).
C. Thorne v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 67(7/20/92). Trustee of charitable foundation
was held liable for §§ 4944(a)(2) and 4945(a)(2) first-tier taxes, for knowingly
making investments which jeopardized charitable purposes [depositing foundation
corpus in unlicensed Bahamian bank] and making taxable expenditures [failing to
exercise expenditure responsibility on grants], respectively, as well as the
additional § 6684 penalty for willful and flagrant conduct.
D. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-29 I.R.B. 11. Guidelines for public interest law firms
exempt under § 501(c)(3), including procedures under which a public interest law
firm may accept fees for its services. Guidelines attempt to distinguish between
"representation of a broad public interest" and "representation of ... a private
interest."
E. State of Michigan v. United States, 802 F Supp. 120, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,424
(W.D. Mich. 7/28/92). Trust guaranteeing payment of college tuition to children
of parents who invested in the trust was not exempt from tax.
F. Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,355 (D.D.C.
5/19/93). Corporation's exempt status was revoked because its activities served
the private interests of its executive director and part of its earning inured to the
benefit of the executive director.
G. Rev. Rul. 92-107 and 92-108, 1992-51 I.R.B. 4 and 5. A fund established and
maintained by (1) a national organization and its local affiliates or (2) a
community trust qualifies as a pooled income fund under § 642(c)(5) under
certain circumstances. But see Notice 93-9, 1993-5 I.R.B. 13 (1/13/93)
(announces revocation of Rev. Rul. 92-108, 1992-51 I.R.B. 5 (relating to pooled
income funds), by Rev. Rul. 93-8, 1993-5 I.R.B. 6(1/13/93)).
H. Announcement 93-2, 1993-2 I.R.B. (12/21/92). Proposed examination
guidelines for colleges and universities for comment before publication in the
Internal Revenue Manual.
1. Greene v. United States, 806 F Supp. 1165, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,033 (S.D.
N.Y. 11/24/92). Charitable contribution to private operating foundation of only
the long-term capital gains portion of commodities futures contracts [characterized
by § 1256 as 60% long-term and 40% short-term capital gain], which were
immediately sold by the private foundation, did not result in the taxation of the
long-term capital gain to the donor on either the "anticipatory assignment of
income" or the "step transaction" theory. The donors had received a 1974 private
letter ruling that they were entitled to a full FMV charitable contribution
deduction and no gain was to be recognized when the charity sold the futures
contracts.
J. PS-56-90, proposed regulations under § 514(c)(9)(E), relating to the application
of the unrelated business income tax to partnerships in which one or more (but
not all) of the partners are qualified tax-exempt organizations (including
educational organizations and § 401 qualified trusts) (F.R. 12/30/92). See also
EE-27-91, proposed regulations under § 514(c)(9) -- publication held up under
0MB memorandum dated 1/25/93.
K. Atlanta Athletic Club v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,051 (11th Cir.
1/11/93), nnU T.C. Memo. 1991-83. 'Thx-exempt social club was not subject to
unrelated business income tax on its $2.3 million gain from a land sale by reason
of the § 512(a)(3)(D) nonrecognition exception where the land was used for club
members' recreation and the sale proceeds were reinvested in recreational
facilities. Direct, albeit desultory, use by occasional member joggers, kite-flyers,
and partiers sufficed, inasmuch as there is no requirement that the members'
recreational use be the "dominant use."
L. Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 4 (1/19/93). 'Tlxpayers were allowed a
$60,000 charitable contribution deduction for donating two blimps to a 170(c)(2)
organization despite their failure to attach to the Form 8283 (completed and
signed by a qualified appraiser) accompanying their tax return, the written
appraisal report required by Reg. § 1.170A-13. The court held the reporting
requirements to be "directory." and not "mandatory" despite the § 170(a)
requirement that a deduction be allowed "only if verified under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary."
M. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,090 (C.D. II.
1/19/93). Crop share rents received by tax-exempt charitable trust were
excludable from UBIT as rent under § 512(b)(3)(A) because there was neither a
joint venture with the tenant nor § 512(b)(3)(B)(ii) nonpassive rent that was
dependent upon tenant's income "(other than an amount based on a fixed
percentage .. . of receipts or sales)." Accord, Trust U/W Oblinger v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 9 (2/23/93).
N. Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,123 (3d Cir.
2/8/93), rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 1991-649. HMO, standing alone,
does not qualify for § 501(c)(3) status because it does not sufficiently benefit the
community in addition to its subscribers. Remanded for determination of whether
it was an integral part of a larger system of nonprofit entities. Geisinger Health
Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 26 (5/3/93), on remand. HMO is not
entitled to § 501(c)(3) exempt status as an integral part of a larger system of
exempt affiliates (under Reg. § 1.502-1(b)) because its activities served the
private purposes of its members (subscribers), and the court was unable to
conclude that the IMO's "operations were so substantively and closely related
to the exempt purposes of its affiliates that those private interests may be
disregarded."
0. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 11 (3/11/93).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require the
Commissioner to initiate judicial review before revoking in 1990, retroactively
to 1984, her predecessor's 1969 favorable ruling letter that determined petitioner
to be exempt under § 501(c)(3).
P. TAM 9302002 (9/24/92). Corporation that provides fund-raising services to
nonprofit oIganizations was not allowed to exclude from gross income a reserve
for the anticipated amount of uncollectible pledges.
Q. Hearst Corp. v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,303 (Fed. Cl. 5/4/93).
Mixpayer failed to show the value of its Hearst Metrotome News File Library
contributed to UCLA exceeded the $1.8 million allowed by the IRS. Although
the donation took place in four deliveries over the years 1981-1985, the step
transaction doctrine was applied to make sales occurring after the first (1981)
delivery irrelevant for comparison purposes because "the substance of the
transaction [revealed] that the ultimate result was intended from the outset,"
following King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 69-2 U.S.T.C.
9720 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (which did not restrict the step transaction doctrine to
situations where the parties have a binding commitment to take steps remaining
after the first step).
R. 1993 Act §13171 makes permanent the relief from AMT of gifts of appreciated
property to charities by repealing Code §57(a)(6), effective for contributions made
after 6/30/92 (tangible personal property) and for other property after 1993.
S. 1993 Act §§13172-3 amend Code §170 and add new Code §§ 6115 and 6714 to
require substantiation of all contributions of more than $250 and written
disclosure of all quid pro quo contributions in excess of $75, effective 1/1/94.
VII. Interest
A. ProDosed regulations (IA-55-90) under § 6611, clarifying the period during
which interest is allowed on overpayments that are credited against a taxpayer's
liability for interest (F.R. 8/25/92).
B3. Rev. Rul. 92-91, 1992-44 I.R.B. 4. Homeowner's interest overcharges and
recoveries by reason of financial institution's miscalculation of interest on
adjustable rate mortgage are (1) deductible under § 163(h)(3) in the year of
payment, and (2) includable in gross income in the year of recovery to the extent
that the deduction of the overcharge reduced the homeowner's federal income tax
in a prior tax year.
C. Sharp v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 52, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,561 (Cl. Ct.
10/30/92). Investment interest that was disallowed under § 163(d) may be carried
over from loss years, and the amount of investment interest that may be carried
over is not limited by any taxable income cap. The court followed the "plain
language of § 163(d)(2)" and disregarded contrary legislative history. Beyer v.
Commissioner, 916 F2d 153, 90-2 U.S.T.C. 50,536 (4th Cir. 1990), followed.
D. "T.D. 8447, final regulations under § 6621(c), regarding an increase in the rate
of interest payable on large corporate underpayments (11/10/92).
E. FI-189-84, proposed regulations on debt instruments with OD (F.R. 12/22/92).
F. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,034
(S.D. N.Y. 11/19/92) (Wood, J.). Discounts (at 8% annual rates) given by New
York City to induce taxpayer to prepay its real property tax installments
constituted § 103 interest payments from N.Y.C. to taxpayer. The prepayments
are to be treated as loans, with the entire undiscounted amounts of its tax
liabilities deductible under § 164(a)(1) as property taxes paid or accrued.
G. T.D. 8463, final regulations under § 1286, relating to OD treatment by taxpayers
holding stripped bonds and stripped coupons (12/28/92).
H. TAM 9307005 (10/27/92). The interest income received by an individual on a
federal tax refund is includable in computing 163(d) net investment income, even
though an overpayment of tax is not an investment in the usual sense.
I. Security Bank Minnesota v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,301 (8th Cir.
5/21/93)(2-1), aff 98 T.C. No. 4(1992). The § 1281(a)(2) mandatory accrual
rules do not apply to bank loans bearing only stated interest, made in the ordinary
course of business by a cash basis bank. The court found the general statutory
scheme in which §§ 1281 through 1283 fit to be concerned with the treatment of
discounted obligations, as was the legislative history to the Tax Reform Act of
1984.
J. T.D. 8476, final regulations under §§ 147-150 and 103A, relating to arbitrage
restrictions applicable to tax-exempt bonds issued by state and local governments
(6/14/93).
K. 1993 Act 413206(d) amends Code §163(d) by restricting net investment income
treatment of capital gains, for purposes of deducting interest, unless taxpayer
elects to reduce the amount of net capital gain eligible for the 28% maximum
capital gains rate, effective for tax years beginning after 1992.
L. Williams v. Commissioner, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,423 (7th Cir. 7/23/93). Interest
and expense deduction arising from a payment made more than 6 months after a
condominium sales contract was executed--where the second equal payment was
to be made 30 years after--was disallowed because the condominium sale took
place when the installment payment was made (on the contract settlement date),
and not the earlier contract date.
M. Gatto v. Commissioner, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,423 (9th Cir. 7/26/93). Interest
deductions under §163 disallowed on loans made back to grantor/taxpayer by
trusts he created and funded. Each fund transfer from grantor was soon followed
by a return of the cash to the grantor in exchange for a promissory note bearing
20% interest.
N. Lenz v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. No. 17 (9/30/93). The carryover of excess
investment interest under §163(d) is not limited by the amount of the taxpayer's
taxable income in the year the expense was incurred. Tax Court will no longer
follow its decision in Beyer v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1304 (1989), but agrees
with the Court of Appeals decision in that case (916 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1990)).
0. Ratliff v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. No. 18 (9/30/93). Allocation of payments
in interest bearing notes to principal until fully paid, and thereafter to interest,
does not, as a matter of law, control the allocation of payments for income tax
purposes.
VIII. Nontaxable Exchanges
A. TAM 9227002 (2/27/92). S corporation's sale of professional sports franchise
not eligible for § 1033 involuntary conversion relief where it was the sports
stadium (owned by a related, but separate, partnership consisting of the S
corporation shareholders and family members), and not the team, that was
threatened with condemnation by the city, even though the league required
common family ownership of the team and its home stadium.
B. Proposed regulations (IA-107-91) under §§ 453 and 1031, relating to the
coordination of the § 1031 (a)(3) deferred like-kind exchange provisions with the
§ 453 installment sale provisions (F.R. 11/2/92).
C. Suffness v. United States, 974 F2d 608, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,513 (5th Cir.
10/8/92). "lhxpayers owed interest on the amount of additional tax they remitted
after they failed timely to reinvest, in like-kind property under § 1071 and
§ 1033, the proceeds of the involuntary conversion of FCC broadcast property.
D. Rev. Rul. 92-95, 1992-45 I.R.B. 5. A (new) annuity contract acquired in
exchange for another (old) annuity contract in a 1035 transaction has as its date
of purchase for purposes of § 72(u)(4) (defining "immediate annuity") and
§ 72(q)(2)(I) (exempting distributions under an immediate annuity from the
§ 72(q)(1) premature withdrawal penalty) the date of purchase of the old annuity
contract.
E. Rev. Rul. 92-105, 1992-49 I.R.B. (11/19/92). Taxpayer's interest in an Illinois
land trust constitutes real property which may be exchanged for other real
property under § 1031. The holding is not applicable if the arrangement creates
an entity (such as a partnership). (Several states, including California, Florida
and Virginia, have laws that permit similar arrangements under which the trustee
holds title and the beneficiary has the exclusive right to direct the trustee on title
matters and the exclusive control of property management (together with the
benefits and obligations of property ownership).)
F. Ames v. United States, 981 E2d 456, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,016 (9th Cir.
12/11/92). Affirms district court's grant of summary judgment to taxpayer,
holding that the divorce-settlement redemption of taxpayer's stock (in a
corporation she owned equally with her former husband) qualified for exemption
under § 1041. The former husband was held to have been relieved of an
obligation by the corporate redemption. so A-9 of Temp. Peg, & 1.10401-IT
would treat taxpayer's stock as having been transferred to her former husband.
and then retransferred to the corporation (the "third party") in a non-& 1041
transaction. The $450,000 cash is to be treated as paid to taxpayer by the
corporation on behalf of her former husband (and presumably constituted a
taxable distribution to her former husband). See, lmp. Peg. §1.1041-1T, A-2,
Ex. (3).
G. TAM 9252001 (2/12/92). Receipt of like-kind real property by a surviving
corporation following a merger in exchange for property transferred by a
predecessor corporation prior to the merger qualified for § 1031 nonrecognition
treatment.
H. 1993 Act §13114 adds new Code §1044 permitting deferral of up to $50,000
(individuals) or $250,000 (C corporations) of capital gain on the sale of publicly
traded securities, the proceeds of which are reinvested in a "specialized small
business investment company" (SBIC), effective for sales on or after 8/10/93.
IX. Partnerships
A. Partnership Audit Rules
1. Harris v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 121 (7/28/92). NOL carrybacks
attributable to settlement of partnership items of a TEFRA partnership
may be taken into account in a Rule 155 computation in partners' personal
tax (non-TEFRA) proceeding.
2. Treaty Pines Investment Partnership v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 206,
92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,418 (5th Cir. 8/5/92). Tax Court improperly refused
to exercise jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a settlement with IRS
concerning taxpayers' partnership items, and (inasmuch as the settlement
was valid despite its not being on Form 906) the hx Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to order taxpayers to comply with the terms of the
Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment.
3. McKnight v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 8 (8/5/92). Small partnership
exception in TEFRA applies to "simple" partnerships where the same-
share rule is satisfied, as it was according to Reg. § 301.6231(a)-lT(a)(3)
where only items "available for distribution" during the year were
considered, and certain other items (i.e., those consistently exclusive to
a partner) were excluded from the rules.
4. Hambrose Leasing 1984-5 Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 99
T.C. No. 15 (9/1/92). Determination of individual partners' amounts at
risk with respect to partnership liabilities personally assumed by individual
partners is not a partnership item, but is an affected item, which can be
dealt with only in a partner-level proceeding.
5. Dubin v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 17 (10/14/92). Commissioner
failed to comply with the TEFRA procedures with respect to the taxpayer
wife of a bankrupt husband who held their partnership interests as
community property. All the items in the statutory notice sent to her were
partnership items or affected items, and the statutory notice was invalid
because bmp. Reg. § 301.6231(c)-7T(a) bankruptcy rule could not be
applied to taxpayer-wife, who, herself, was not bankrupt -- even though,
for other purposes, husband and wife are treated as one.
B. Miscellaneous
1. Mark IV Pictures. Inc. v. Commissioner, 969 F.2d 669, 92-2 U.S.T.C.
50,365 (8th Cir. 7/13/92), gff & TC. Memo. 1990-571. Affirms Tax
Court findings that general partners in religious film production limited
partnership: (1) received their general partnership interests in exchange for
services rather than property [because lack of written contracts and ann's
length negotiations precluded partners from showing that film rights were
exchanged for partnership interests], and (2) received capital interests
rather than profits interests [because of shift in capital occurring at
formation giving them the right to receive 50% of liquidation proceeds].
2. Rev. Rul. 92-97, 1992-46 I.R.B. (10/29/92). The allocation to a partner
of his share of the partnership's cancellation of indebtedness (COD)
income that differs from his share of the canceled debt under § 752(b) has
substantial economic effect under § 704(b) if (1) deficit restoration
obligations covering the resulting negative capital account balances can be
invoked to satisfy other partners' positive capital account balances, (2) the
requirements of the economic test are otherwise met, and (3) substantiality
is independently established. But if there is no deficit restoration offset,
taxpayer cannot achieve substantial economic effect by using a "qualified
income offset" -- even though this is a safe harbor in the § 704(b)
regulations.
3. Classification
a. Proposed amendments of regulations (PS-7-92), which amends
Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), regarding the characteristic of continuity
of life, to permit a majority of interest of the remaining general
and limited partners combined to agree to continue a partnership
upon an event of withdrawal of a general partner without the
partnership having "continuity of life" (F.R. 7/22/92). TD. 8475,
final regulations amending Reg. § 301.7701-2, regarding the
characteristic of continuity of life of a limited partnership
(5/13/93).
b. Rev. Proc. 92-88, 1992-42 I.R.B. 39. Guidance regarding
classification of limited partnerships formed under a state limited
partnership act that IRS has determined (in a published ruling)
corresponds to the ULPA. Generally follows Rev. Proc. 89-12,
1989-1 C.B. 798, except for net worth rules for individual general
partners (the lesser of 10% of total contributions or $1 million,
excluding any interest in the partnership). See also, Rev. Proc.
92-87, 1992-42 I.R.B. 38 (IRS will not rule whether partnerships
that satisfy the Rev. Proc. 92-88 guidelines are classified as
partnerships).
c. Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-3 I.R.B. 6(12/28/92). A Virginia limited
liability company is classified for federal tax purposes as a
partnership because it lacks the corporate characteristics of
continuity of life and free transferability of interests. See also,
Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 I.R.B. 8 (12/28/92) (same ruling for
Colorado LLCs). Both states have "bulletproof LLC statutes.
d. Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-16 I.R.B. 4. Nevada limited-liability
company is classified as a partnership because it lacks a
preponderance of the four corporate characteristics, in that it
possesses centralized management and limited liability but does not
possess continuity of life and free transferability of interests.
e. Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-21 I.R.B. 4. Depending upon the
provisions of its LLC agreement, a Delaware LLC can assume for
federal tax purposes the characteristics of a partnership (Situation
1: lacking continuity of life, centralized management and free
transferability of interests, and possessing limited liability), or it
can assume the characteristics of an association (Situation 2:
possessing the four characteristics).
f. Rev. Rui. 92-49, 1992-26 I.R.B. 8, amplifying Rev. Rul. 57-7,
1957-1 C.B. 435. IRS will continue to take the position that the
arrangement between the owner of coin-operated amusements and
the occupant of premises is a lease from the occupant (as lessor)
to the owner (as lessee). It will, however, not challenge a
taxpayer's good faith position that such an arrangement is a joint
venture.
g. Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-25 I.R.B. 13. West Virginia LLC is
classified as a partnership under a "bulletproof" statute.
h. Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-26 I.R.B. 7. Florida LLC may be
classified as a partnership or an association, depending upon its
articles of organization. The LLC considered is classified as a
partnership because it lacks continuity of life and free
transferability of interest.
4. Proposed regulations (PS-103-90) under § 761, relating to requirements
to be met by natural gas producers subject to a gas balancing agreement
in order to elect under § 761(a) to be excluded from the application of
subchapter K (F.R. 9/16/92). Provides additional rules (i.e., must use
"cumulative gas balancing method" unless all the producers in the same
GRA agree in writing to use the "annual gas balancing method") to
eliminate the potential for prolonged deferral of income where producers
under a single GBA (co-owners) use different methods (i.e., the
entitlement method and the sales method) to account for gas sales.
5. Rev. Proc. 92-92, 1992-46 I.R.B. 34. The IRS will not challenge a
bankrupt or insolvent partnership's treatment of a reduction of an
indebtedness as a 108(e)(5) purchase price adjustment, provided the
transaction otherwise qualifies but for the partnership's bankruptcy or
insolvency.
6. T.D. 8450, final regulations under § 7704, relating to a publicly traded
partnership's adding a "substantial new line of business" (12/10/92). See
also, Rev. Proc. 92-101, 1992-52 I.R.B. 19 (12/11/92) (safe harbor
provisions).
7. T.D. 8439, final regulations under § 707(a)(2), relating to the treatment
of transactions between partners and partnerships, and between partners
themselves, i.e., the partnership disguised sales rules, etc. (9/25/92). See
also, Notice 92-46, 1992-42 I.R.B. 29 (9/25/92) (proposed regulations
may be elected for certain post-4/24/91 transfers if at least one of the
transfers considered part of a sale occurs before 11/30/92).
8. The Comprehensive National Ener= Pblicy Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No.
102-486) requires precontribution gain on property contributed to a
partnership to be recognized on the subsequent distribution of other
property to the contributing partner. Act § 1937, new Code 737, to apply
to distributions on or after 6/25/92.
9. PS-164-84, proposed regulations under § 704(c), relating to allocations
with respect to appreciated property contributed by a partner to a
partnership (ER. 12/24/92). See also PS-50-92 (F.R. 1/4/93).
10. Rev, Rui. 93-7, 1993-4 I.R.B. 5 (12/31/92). If a partnership acquires
indebtedness issued by a partner, and subsequently distributes it to the
partner so that the debt is extinguished, then the § 731(b) distribution of
property rules [nonrecognition of gain or loss, and (if there is a § 754
election in effect) § 734(b) provides for basis adjustment of partnership
property to take into account § 731(a) gain or loss recognition by the
distributee partner or change in the basis of the distributed property under
§ 732] determine the consequences for the partnership, and the partner
will recognize capital gain or loss to the extent the indebtedness' FMV
differs from its § 732 basis [under § 732(a) for nonliquidating
distributions, adjusted basis to the partnership; under § 732(b) for
liquidating distributions, adjusted basis of the partner's interest reduced by
money distributed in the same transaction]. The partner will also have
§ 61(a)(12) cancellation of indebtedness income in the amount by which
the issue price exceeds the FMV of the indebtedness. Reg.
§ 1.731-1(c)(2) applies to direct loans from a partnership to a partner, and
is inapplicable here.
11. Rev. Rul. 93-13, 1993-7 I.R.B. 12. If a partnership with a § 754 election
in effect makes a series of liquidating cash payments to a partner that are
treated as distributions under § 736(b)(1) (i.e., as made in exchange for
the interest of that partner in partnership property), then the § 734(b) basis
adjustments to partnership property will correspond in timing and amount
with the recognition of gain or loss by the retiring partner with respect to
those payments.
12. Rev. Proe. 93-27, 1993-24 I.R.B. (6/9/93). Guidance on the treatment
of the receipt of a partnership profits interest for services. The IRS will
not treat the receipt as a taxable event in the absence of any of the
following: (1) the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and
predictable stream of income from partnership assets; (2) the partner
disposes of the profits interest within 2 years of receipt; or (3) the profits
interest is a limited partnership interest in a § 7704(b) publicly traded
partnership.
13. 1993 Act §13262 amends Code §736(b) to limit deductible treatment of
payments made to retired or deceased partners for goodwill and unrealized
receivables, effective for partners retiring or dying on or after 1/5/93.
X. Personal and Individual Income and Deductions
A. Miscellaneous Deductions and Credits
1. Rev. Proc. 92-71, 1992-35 I.R.B. 17 (8/10/92). Describes account
statements that will be accepted as proof of payment for purposes of
substantiating deductions in lieu of producing canceled checks, such as
bank account statements and credit card charge statements that show the
amount, the date and the name of the payee. (The date shown, however,
is not necessarily the date of the deduction.)
2. Grig,2 v. Commissioner, 979 E2d 383, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,020 (5th Cir.
12/21/92). Taxpayers' vacation condominium, used by them "more than
14 days and more than 10 percent of the days which the unit was rented"
does not fall within the § 280A(fl(l)(B) hotel exception because taxpayers'
personal use of their condominium as a "dwelling" meant they did not use
their condominium "exclusively" as a "hotel, motel, inn or similar
establishment." MTxpayers' condominium losses were made subject to
§ 280A limitations.
3. The Comprehensive National Energy Plicy Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No.
102-486) disallows any deduction for travel expenses while temporarily
away from home in connection with any period of employment exceeding
one year, effective for costs paid or incurred after 12/31/92. Act 1938,
Code § 162(a). See Notice 93-29, 1993-18 I.R.B. 14 (for "away-from-
home" periods of more than one year straddling the end of 1992, travel
expenses incurred before the end of 1992 are deductible, and travel
expenses incurred thereafter are not).
4. Speck v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,202 (Fed. CI. 3/30/93). The
first trial opinion by this court, which denies "away from home"
deductions to a Canadian hockey player, with criticism of the conduct of
taxpayers' counsel in this and 230 other related hockey player tax refund
cases. See Stemkowski v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 40, 82-2 U.S.T.C.
9589 (2d Cir. 1982), for the appeal of one of the 43 cases in the Thx
Court.
5. Rev. Rul. 93-27, 1993-15 I.R.B. 4. Thxpayer is not entitled to a
§ 166(a)(1) bad debt deduction for the amount of her own expenditures for
supporting her children caused by an arrearage in court-ordered child
support payments owed by a former spouse because her expenditures did
not create any basis in the child support obligation (which was. not
contingent upon those expenditures).
6. Induni v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 5J,200 (2d Cir. 4/1/93).
Deductions for mortgage interest and real estate taxes, attributable to tax
exempt living quarters allowance received by INS employee, were
disallowed under § 265(a)(1). The exception to § 265 denial contained in
§ 265(a)(6) applies only to people in the military and the clergy.
7. Kraft v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,278 (6th Cir. 4/7/93).
Restitution to Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan paid by a doctor under
a criminal plea bargain agreement is not eligible for § 1341 treatment
because the funds were not obtained under a "claim of right."
8. O'Neill Trust v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,332 (6th Cir.
6/2/93), re' 98 T.C. 227 (1992). Investment advisor fees paid by trust
where trustees lacked investment experience met the § 67(e) exception to
the § 67(a) two-percent floor, and are deductible in full because they
would not have been incurred if the property had not been held in trust.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Damages
a. Ray v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 535,92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,187
(Cl. Ct. 3/27/92), affd without published opinion, (Fed. Cir.
2/22/93). Damages received in the settlement of a labor dispute
arising from employer's breach of a collective bargaining
agreement were not excludable under § 104(a)(2) because they
were not payments for personal injury.
b. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 8 (2/9193) (reviewed,
15-3). Taxpayers injured in a fire resulting from a gas explosion
caused by utility's negligence could exclude $500,000 punitive
damages under § 104(a)(2) because the punitive damages were
awarded by reason of a tort-type personal injury suit. Miller v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 90-2 U.S.T.C.
50,515 (4th Cir. 1990), adhered to; the court tentatively
distinguished the Fourth Circuit holding on the ground that
Maryland punitive damages (in Miller were "purely punitive,"
while Kentucky punitive damages (this case) serve both to
compensate the injured party and to punish the wrongdoer.
c. Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 10 (2/24/93) (reviewed,
14-5). Statutorily imposed interest on wrongful death damages is
not excludable from income under § 104(a)(2). (Michigan state law
allows compound interest at 6% [12% from 6/1/80] calculated
from the date of filing the complaint to the date of satisfaction of
the judgment.) The portion of attorney's fees allocable to taxable
interest is not deductible above the line and is subject to the 2 %
floor of 67. Dissents based on the amendment to § 104(a)(2) by
the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-473,
which added to the parenthetical "and whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments."
d. Glatthorn v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,338 (S.D. Fla.
4/13/93). Law firm associate's action against his former firm for
contractual damages also contained tort claims (i.e., fraud,
conversion and civil theft), so 1/2 of the settlement was allocated
to tort recovery and was non-taxable under § 104(a)(2).
e. Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 40 (6/29/93) (reviewed),
supplementing 97 T.C. 150 (1991). The entire amount of damages
received by airline pilot under ADEA was excludible under
§104(a)(2). Contra, Maleszewski v. U.S., 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,358
(N.D. Fla. 6/4/93).
f. Reese v. United States, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,447 (Fed. Cl.
7/29/93). Punitive damages received in 1987 by taxpayer in
settlement (after trial) of her suit for sex discrimination, sexual
harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress were
includible in gross income. The court based this conclusion on
three grounds: (i) exceptions to §61 should be construed narrowly;
(ii) the title and subject matter of § 104 focus on payments received
as compensation for injuries or sickness; and (iii) the historical
context of the 1918 enactment of the predecessor to §104(a)(2)
suggests an intentionto exclude only c o m p e n s a t o r y
payments.
2. Rev. Rul. 92-99, 1992-46 I.R.B. 5 (10/30/92). If the principal amount
of an undersecured nonrecourse debt that arose out of the purchase of
property is reduced by the holder of the debt (who was not the seller of
the property), the debt reduction may not be treated as a § 108(e)(5)
purchase price adjustment (in the absence of In infirmity that clearly
relates back to the original sale), but results in § 61(a)(12) discharge of
indebtedness income.
3. Bannon v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 60 (7/20/92). Payments received by
taxpayer from the state of California, under its In-Home Supportive
Services Program, for providing nonmedical care to her totally disabled
adult daughter were includable in taxpayer's gross income.
4. Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-36 I.R.B. 5(8/20/92). Situations where the value
of employer-provided outplacement services qualifies as a § 132(d)
working condition fringe, and does not constitute gross income (or wages
for FICA, FUTA or withholding purposes), because the employer derives
a substantial business benefit (beyond what it would get from "the mere
payment of additional compensation") and the employee's hypothetical
payment would be deductible under § 162.
5. Proposed regulations (EE-101-91) under § 61, relating to the valuation
of an employee's use of employer-provided fuel when an
employer-provided automobile is valued pursuant to the automobile lease
valuation rule (F.R. 10/9/92). Valuation at FMV or, alternatively, 5.5
cents per mile of personal use, with additional methods for automobile
fleets.
6. Rev. Rul. 92-109, 1992-52 I.R.B. 5 (12/8/92). United States citizens
who lost their U.S. citizenship and subsequently had it restored are not
liable for federal income and gift taxes in the interim.
7. FI-25-92, proposed regulations under §§ 101,7702 and 7702A, relating to
the federal income tax treatments of amounts received as "qualified
accelerated death benefits" by terminally ill individuals (F.R. 12/15/92).
See Notice 93-37 for delay in effective date to date of publication of final
regulations.
8. Cato v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 33 (12/22/92). Amounts received
by taxpayers from a § 501(c)(3) placement agency for operating a foster
family home for developmentally disabled children are excludable under
§ 131 (added by the lx Reform Act of 1986). With respect to the 1985
tax year to which § 131 was inapplicable, the excess of foster care
payments over expenses is both includable in gross income and subject to
self-employment tax.
9. Dodge v. Commissioner, 981 F2d 350, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,021 (8th
Cir. 12/9/92). Affirms finding that taxpayer, an "insurance speculator"
who carried 30 to 60 hospital indemnification policies (paying a fixed
amount per hospitalized day) and had a "friendly" doctor admit him into
a hospital, could not exclude policy benefits under § 104(a)(3) for six
hospitalizations for back and neck pain after alleged falls because taxpayer
did not suffer any legitimate illness or injury. However, § 104(a)(3)
exclusion treatment was available for the seventh hospitalization for a
perforated colon [a side effect of a biopsy performed in anticipation of a
hemorrhoidectomy] where he did undergo surgery.
10. T.D. 8460, final regulations under § 108(e)(4), relating to the acquisition
of indebtedness by a person related to the debtor (12/28/92).
11. T.D. 8457, final amendments of regulations under §§ 61 and 132, relating
to the valuation of fringe benefits under § 61 [eliminates requirement that
employers notify employees of use of a special valuation rule and clarifies
requirements for using such rules] and the exclusion of certain benefits as
working condition fringes under § 132(a)(3) [sets forth rules for
transportation provided to government employees because of security
concerns and provides for exclusion of the value of directors' and officers'
liability insurance protection provided by an § 501(a) exempt organization
to its bona fide volunteers from their income under § 132(d)] (12/29/92).
12. The Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No.
102-486) limits employer-provided transit subsidies to be excluded from
taxable income would be raised from $21 to $60 per month. Amount of
employer-provided parking assistance which may be excluded would be
capped at $155. ("Employee" is defined for this purpose as not to include
the self-employed. New Code § 132(fl(5)(E).) Act § 1911, Code § 132.
13. Rev. Rul. 93-43, 1993-24 I.R.B. 54. Under §123, if total insurance
proceeds received for increased living expenses incurred due to a casualty
exceeds the individual's increased living expenses during the loss period,
the excess portion is includable in gross income for the year in which the
loss period ends (or, if later, the year in which the excess portion of the
insurance proceeds is received).
14. 1993 Act § 13201-5 increase top individual rate to 36%; impose 39.6
rate on income over $250,000; leave capital gain unaffected; increase
individual AMT rate to 26-28%; and make permanent the §68 itemized
deduction phase-out (Pease) and §151(d) personal exemption phase-out
(PEP). There is a 3-year installment election for payment of any 1993
regular tax increases. Regarding the application of this same rate
structure to estates see, Barnett, "Further Tax Discrimination Against the
Dead," Tax Notes, Sept., 13, 1993.
15. 1993 Act §13215 increases the taxable por ion of Social Security
retirement benefits under Code §86 for more affluent [married over
$44,000] to 85 %, effective, 1/1/94.
16. 1993 Act §13213 imposes substantial new restrictions on the Code §217
deduction for moving expenses, effective 1/1/94.
17. 1993 Act §13101 extends the §127 employer-provided educational
assistance exclusion, retroactively from 7/1/92 through 12/31/94.
XI. Procedure. Penalties and Prosecutions
A. Penalties and Prosecutions
1. Leuhsler v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 907, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,374 (6th
Cir. 5/11/92). Negligence penalty imposed on CPA who invested in tax
shelter master recording leases that lacked economic substance. Heasley
v. Commissioner, 902 R 2d 380, 90-1 U.S.T.C. 1 50,314 (5th Cir. 1990),
distinguished.
2. Mitchell v. United States, 977 F.2d 1318, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,512 (9th
Cir. 10/9/92), rev'g and remanding 90-2 U.S.T.C. 50,495 (W.D. Wash
1990). "ibxpayer was subject to a separate § 6701(a) penalty for aiding in
the preparation of each of 34 Forms K-i containing information that
investors incorporated into their tax returns that resulted in
understatements.
3. Knudsen v. United States, 966 F.2d 733, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,332 (2d
Cir. 6/10/92). Payment of FICA taxes into federal depository account by
corporation shortly before bankruptcy constitutes a defense by responsible
officer to § 6672 penalty for unpaid taxes, even though the bank
subsequently reversed its credit to the depository account and applied the
monies towards repayment of a commercial bank loan owed by the
corporation.
4. Turpin v. United States, 970 F.2d 1344, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,383 (4th
Cir. 7/17/92), rev'g and remanding 91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,403 (D. Md.
7/25/91). President and sole shareholder of coal operating company did
not willfully fail to collect and pay over withholding taxes because he
reasonably believed that the company that owned the facility at which the
mining took place had paid the taxes.
5. Barnett v. IRS, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,269 (5th Cir. 4/28/93). A 20%
shareholder/corporate officer of a bankrupt oil and gas drilling company
whose other 20 % shareholder/corporate officer failed to pay over withheld
taxes is a responsible person under § 6672 because he signed checks to
pay other creditors after he became aware of the withholding tax liability.
6. Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 11 (8/11/92). Fraud
penalties applied on tax protester's underpayments as a result of his failure
to file returns or pay taxes, or to file delinquent returns [which themselves
omitted the lion's share of his income] until after being notified of IRS's
investigation. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 91-1 U.S.T.C.
50,012 (1991), followed as it differentiates between "a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law" and "a good-faith belief that the law is
invalid or a good-faith disagreement with the law," the latter entailing the
obligation of "[taking] the risk of being wrong."
7. Conti v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 20 (9/29/92). Thxpayers were not
entitled to offer into evidence the results of polygraph tests administered
to them unilaterally, without notice to Commissioner, to corroborate a
cash hoard claim (to avoid deficiencies, fraud penalties and substantial
understatement penalties).
8. Lamb v. United States, 977 E2d 1296, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,538 (8th
Cir. 10/30/92). There is no statute of limitations for the government to
assess penalties under § 6700 [for promoting an abusive tax shelter] and
§ 6701 [for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liabilities] because
the 5-year "catch-all" statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, does not
apply to the Internal Revenue Code. The court followed Mullikin v.
United States, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,020 (6th Cir. 1991).
9. United States v. Sanford, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,055 (11th Cir. 12/29/92).
Bankruptcy court lacked the equitable power to reduce, in part, penalties
under § 6651(a)(1) (failure to file), § 6651(a)(2) (failure to.pay) and
§ 6654(a) (underpayment of estimated tax). These penalties may either be
waived in full for each tax year or be applied in full, but may not be
reduced.
10. Reiss v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,086 (8th Cir. 1/14/93). The
failure of a notice of assessment of § 6694 preparer penalties to comply
with § 7522 by including the particularities of each assessed penalty did
not invalidate the notice of assessment where there was sufficient
information "to identify the returns involved, the nature of the error
charged, and the amounts of the assessment."
11. McMurray v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,107 (1st Cir. 2/9/93).
MTxpayers avoided former § 6653 negligence and former § 6659 charitable
valuation overstatement penalties with respect to their claimed deductions
of $1,360,000 on their donation of a $29,450 peat bog to a charity for
conservation purposes because they reasonably, and in good faith, relied
on a professional real estate appraiser's valuations based upon the
commercial value of the peat contained in the bog even though permits for
harvesting were highly unlikely to be granted.
12. Notice 93-22, 1993-17 I.R.B. 11 (4/7/93). Notice providing relief from
the requirement -- contained in both the § 6081 regulations and the
instructions to Form § 4868 -- that the automatic 4-month filing extension
may be obtained only upon full payment of the tax properly estimated to
be due, and no late filing penalty will be assessed. However, the (1/2%
per month) late payment penalty and interest on the underpayment, as
applicable, will be imposed. Effective through 8/15/93.
13. Mando v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,340 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
5/12/93). IRS held to be estopped to pursue president of optical company
for. § 6672 "responsible person" penalties because of revenue officers'
course of conduct in determining that he was not a "responsible person"
[a determination later reversed without further factual development] while
encouraging him to continue operating the business.. (The president's
culpable brother [the secretary-treasurer] took full responsibility for the
failures to pay.) The court found estoppel by reason of the government's
failure to meet its "minimum standard of decency, honor and reliability."
14. Khmie v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,311 (6th Cir. 5/24/93).
IRS not required to follow the oral designation of corporate accountant
with respect to monies tendered to pay trust fund taxes, but was free to
apply the payment to non-trust fund taxes. Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 C.B.
283, and Rev. Rul. 73-305, 1973-2 C.B. 43, followed.
15. Bassett v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 41 (6/30/93). The parents of a
child actress who failed to file income tax returns were obligated under
§6012(b)(2), as her guardians, to file tax returns on her behalf. The
§6651(a) failure to file penalty was properly applied to the child actress
because her parents had a duty to file and their failure was not due to
reasonable cause.
16. 1993 Act §13214 modifies the Code §6654 individual estimated tax safe
harbor based on the preceding year's tax where AGI exceeds $150,000,
by: (i) eliminating the 1990 Act removal of the safe harbor where income
increases sharply and (ii) substituting a new 110 % [of last year's income]
safe harbor, effective for taxable years beginning after 1993.
17. 1993 Act §13251 imposes a stricter standard for the Code §6662
accuracy-related penalty, effective 1/1/94. "Reasonable basis" replaces
"not frivolous" as the floor for avoiding the penalty where adequate
disclosure is made on tax returns. No corresponding change was made to
the §6694 preparer penalty.
B. Summons
1. DiAndre v. United States, 968 E2d 1049, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,373 (10th
Cir. 7/7/92). No violation of § 6103 occurred when the IRS disclosed
certain tax return information in a circular letter sent to the corporation's
customers in the course of a criminal investigation where the disclosure
met the § 6103(k)(6) safe harbor, i.e., as relating to tax liability
determination, that the information sought not otherwise reasonably
available and that the disclosures were necessary to obtain the information
sought.
2. United States v. Church of Scientology Western United States, 973
F.2d 715, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,441 (8/19/92), aftg, unreported District
Court decisions. Partial enforcement of IRS Church summonses affirmed
where IRS inquiries had "appropriate purpose and [were] not the product
of bad faith"; however, § 7611 imposes upon IRS the special duty of
showing "actual necessity" for the church documents sought, which goes
beyond the "relevance" standard for other types of summonses. (The
Church hx Inquiry Letter set out as concerns (1) substantial nonexempt
commercial purpose and (2) private inurement.)
3. United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,454 (5th Cir.
8128192) (per curiam). Psychotherapist's accounts receivable records
were not protected by privilege against IRS summons because, even if
there were a privilege, the identity of a patient or the fact and time of
treatment would not be within it.
4. Wooden Horse Investments, Inc. v. United States, 806 F Supp. 1487,
92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,482 (E.D. Wash. 8/12/92). Summonses ordered
enforced over taxpayer's claim that they were issued in retaliation for its
refusal to extend the statute of limitations because they were not issued in
bad faith but merely sought information relating to taxpayer's deduction
of $25 million interest on $100,000 worth of debt.
5. Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 447,
92- 2 U.S.T.C. 50,562 (U.S. 11/16/92). Compliance with District
Court summons enforcement order, by delivery of tapes by state court to
the IRS, did not moot the Church's appeal because of the existence of
power in the Court of Appeals to effectuate a partial remedy by ordering
the return or destruction of the tapes.
6. Grandbouche v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 31 (11/30/92). Protective
order was granted on behalf of a tax-protestor type of barter organization
to limit a subpoena duces tecum to the organization's bank to those
documents relating to the petitioner in the case at hand, in order to protect
the First Amendment rights of freedom of association of the organization's
other members.
7. United States v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,067 (S.D.
N.Y. 1/25/3). IRS summons under § 7602(a) for names of seven client
"§ 453 partnerships" [partnerships engaging in transactions using the
§ 453 installment sales provisions] was enforced under Tiffany Fine Arts,
Inc. v. United States, 85-1 U.S.T.C. § 9117 (U.S. 1985), because the
information was relevant for the dual purpose of both a legitimate
investigation of the tax liabilities of Merrill Lynch itself and an
investigation of the tax liabilities of the § 453 partnerships. The § 7609(f)
third-party summons requirements did not have to be followed.
C. Litifation Costs
1. IA-003-89, proposed regulations under § 7430, relating to the recovery of
administrative costs incurred by taxpayers in IRS administrative
proceedings (ER. 12/23/92).
2. Heaslev v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 116, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,412 (5th
Cir. 7/20/92), aff g. rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo 1991-189.
Attorney's fees awarded with respect to negligence and substantial
understatement penalties, but not valuation overstatement and additional
interest penalties on which the IRS was not "not substantially justified,"
because taxpayers "substantially prevailed." The $100 to $200 per hour
actually charged by attorneys was reduced to the $75 statutory rate, with
COLA from 1/1/86 § 7430 date -- not from the 1/1/81 EAIA date.
3. Estate of Hubberd v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 18 (9/16/92). The
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) net worth requirement [$2 million or less for
individuals and $7 million or less for business owners, partnerships,
corporations, associations, etc.] applies to the award of § 7430 litigation
costs to an estate, and it is the net worth of the estate that is to be
considered. (lxpayer argued that the net worth of the estate beneficiaries
should have been considered.)
4. Hone v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 8 (2/9/93). The
§ 7430(c)(4)(A)(iii) net worth limitation of $2 million on recovery of
litigation costs is to be applied on an individual basis to spouses, each of
whose individual net worth was below $2 million, but whose combined net
worth exceeded $2 million. The vetoed Revenue Bill of 1992, H.R. 11,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4914, provided that spouses filing a joint return
were to have been treated as one individual for purposes of the net worth
requirement.
5. Hanson v. Commissioner, 975 E2d 1150, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,554 (5th
Cir. 10/26/92), m an unreported Mix Court decision. Litigation
expenses awarded to pro se taxpayers because notice of deficiency issued
in 1988 was barred by the statute of limitations, as conceded after one
year of litigation, and the IRS position was not "substantially justified"
with respect to taxpayers who in 1980 filed a genuine return for the 1977
year (following the failure of tax protester litigation, and one taxpayer's
criminal conviction for willful failure to file a return for the 1977 year).
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that taxpayer's brief motions, albeit
accompanied by legal memoranda and numerous exhibits relating to
taxpayers' earlier attempts to invalidate the tax system, were themselves
not improper and the Tax Court abused its discretion in denying litigation
expenses.
6. Kreidle v. Department of Treasury, 92-2 U.S.T. C. 50,449 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 6/23/92). Section 7430 attorney's fees awarded based upon parties'
stipulations -- despite IRS counsel's attempt to withdraw them one day
later, on the argument that debtor's counsel was a "litigation-crazed
fiend." The court did not acquiesce in that characterization.
7. Barton v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,144 (8th Cir. 3/11/93).
District court abused its discretion in denying § 7430 attorneys' fees
because government could not reasonably have concluded that the
executive vice president [second in command], with authority to sign
checks and knowledge of the corporation's unpaid withholding taxes, was
a responsible person under § 6672 in light of his lack of responsibility for
paying withholding taxes.
8. Portillo v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,222 (5th Cir. 4/13/93),
rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 1992-99. Government position [that an
unsubstantiated and unreliable Form 1099 submitted to the IRS by a
contractor who dealt with taxpayer was sufficient support for a notice of
deficiency] was not "substantially justified," so remanded for
determination of taxpayer's attorney's fees and costs.
9. Wilfong v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,232 (7th Cir. 4/8/93).
Attorney's fee award by district court to CPA who contested § 6694
preparer penalties was reversed because the government's position was
substantially justified. Although the CPA prevailed: in a jury trial, the
evidence was such that the jury could have found the CPA negligent had
it believed the government's evidence.
10. Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 30 (5/25/93). Litigation costs
under § 7430 awarded where statutory notice lacked reasonable
justification because IRS had no information about the underlying facts,
and made no attempt to obtain information, before issuing the statutory
notice in order to avoid expiration of the statute of limitations following
receipt of taxpayer's Form 872-T.
11. Lennox v. Commissioner, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 150,444 (5th Cir. 8/4/93),
rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 1992-382. 'Ax Court's refusal for
purposes of amending §7430 litigation costs to consider events predating
the notice of deficiency was improper and the Tax Court abused its
discretion in finding the IRS position "substantially justified" on issuance
of the notice where (i) taxpayers offered a limited extension of the statute
of limitations (which was refused because 35 days was not long enough
to get higher-level approval for its specific language) and (ii) the IRS
surrendered more than a year after the Tax Court petition was filed
without being given any additional information. The court found that the
fact that "the IRS had a basis for suspicion" was not "a sufficient basis for
issuance of the notice, in light of the opportunity for further, and much
needed, investigation."
D. Statutory Notice
1. Powerstein v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 22 (9/30/92). Assessments
based upon the amounts shown as tax on amended returns filed during the
pendency of a TMx Court proceeding violated the § 6213(a) restrictions on
assessments.
2. AOD No. 19934, 1993-22 I.R.B. 4. Nonacquiesces in Powell v.
Commissioner, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,147 (4th Cir. 1992), with respect to
the issue relating to "whether a last known address may change subsequent
to the mailing of a notice of deficiency."
3. Balkissoon v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,347 (4th Cir. 6/11/93).
Commissioner's failure to send notice of deficiency "by certified mail or
registered mail" as authorized by § 6212(a) is inconsequential where
taxpayers actually received the notice of deficiency sent by ordinary mail
and were able to petition the hx Court for redetermination. Section
6212(a) was held to be "a safe harbor to be relied upon only in those
situations in which the taxpayer did not receive actual notice."
E. Statute of Limitations
1. Passthrough Entities
a. Bufferd v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 927, 91-3 U.S.T.C.
50,038 (U.S. 1/25/93) (9-0), aff .g, 952 F2d 675,92-1 U.S.T.C.
50,031 (2d Cir. 1992). The 3-year period on which the IRS is
permitted to assess an S corporation's shareholder's tax liability
with respect to "pass-through" items runs from the filing date of
the individual return, and not from the filing date of the corporate
return.
b. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,340
(5th Cir. 6/22/92). The expiration ef the § 6501 period of
limitations as to S corporations does not preclude the
Commissioner from assessing deficiencies attributable to the
disallowance of losses passed through from the S corporations to
shareholders whose tax years were still open. Fehlhaber v.
Commissioner, 954 R2d 653,92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,131 (11th Cir.
1992), followed.
c. Lardas v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 490 (10/22/92) (reviewed,
15-1). Deficiencies determined against the grantor of two grantor
trusts (based upon disallowance of losses in the trusts) were timely
even though issued more than three years after the trusts filed their
information returns. The doctrine in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 742 (1970), aftd, 445 F2d 985, 71-2 U.S.TC. 9497
(10th Cir. 1971), does not require the Tax Court to follow the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 E2d 756,
89-1 U.S.T.C. 9360 (1989), on the ground that it was not
squarely in point because it concerned an S corporation. Dissent
based upon Fendell v. Commissioner, 906 E2d 362, 90-2
U.S.T.C. 50,345 (8th Cir. 1990) (concerning a complex trust).
2. Galuska v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 661 (6/22/92). Forms 4868 and 2688
applications for extension do not constitute "returns" in order for taxpayer
to receive an overpayment of his 1986 tax where no Form 1040 was filed
for that year within the § 6511(b) [3-year or 2-year] period for filing a
claim for refund.
3. Allen v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 23 (10/6/92). 'lhxpayer not entitled
to a refund of overpaid taxes based upon the § 6511(b)(2)(A) 3-year
period, made applicable by § 6512(b)(3)(B), with respect to a return filed
after the mailing of the deficiency notice.
4. Scheidt V. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 1448, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,326 (10th
Cir. 6/18/92). Misaddressed notice of deficiency [P.O. Box 20711 vice
20748] tolled the statute of limitations even though it was not actually
received by taxpayers until 21 days after the limitations period expired,
but 63 days before taxpayers were required to file a mhx Court petition.
5. Hail v. United States, 975 F.2d 722,92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,470 (10th Cir.
9/16/92) (2-1), mevg 91-1 U.S.T.C. 50,104 (D. Utah 1991). The
1311-1314 mitigation of limitations provisions axe limited to income taxes,
and are not available to taxpayers seeking refunds of overpaid windfall
profit taxes. The court relies on Reg. § 1.131 1(a)-2(b), which so limits
applicability and the omission of mention of windfall profit taxes in
§ 1312 ("Circumstances of Adjustment"). The dissent relies on
Chertkof v. United States, 676 F.2d 984, 82-1 U.S.T.C. 9282 (4th Cir.
1982).
6. Indiana National Corp. v. United States, 980 F.2d 1098, 92-2 U.S.T.C.
50,610 (7th Cir. 11/30/92). A corporation's refund claim based on an
NOL carryback is governed by the 381/2-month limitations period of
§ 6511(d)(2)(A) [measured from the end of the loss year], and not by the
7-year limitation period of § 6511(d)(1) with respect to bad debt
deductions that were included in the NOLs, except to the extent that these
deductions resulted from recalculations which increased the NOL after the
original filing. Taxpayer correctly determined, or overestimated, its bad
debt deductions in the first place, so the special 7-year limitation period
was applicable.
7. Ginter v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,079 (W.D. Mo. 1/6/93).
The reporting of payments to workers as nonemployee compensation on
Forms 1099 does not trigger the § 6501 three-year statute of limitations
for assessment of employment taxes with respect to those same workers
because the statute of limitations for assessment of employment taxes can
be triggered only by filing Forms 940 and 941.
8. Aronson v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,174 (2d Cir. 3/24/93)
(per curiam). "lhxpayer was not entitled to rely on a statement in IRS
Publication 1035 that a Form 872-A consent keeps the statute of
limitations open until the IRS or the taxpayer files "written notice ending
the agreement" in light of the Form 872-A specifically mentioning Form
872-T as the proper method for taxpayer termination of consent. (There
had been a fact issue as to whether taxpayer had enclosed cover letter with
his Forms 872-A limiting the extensions, which fact issue the Tax Court
had resolved against the taxpayer.)
9. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. No.
20 (10/7/93). Special 6-year period of limitations contained in §6501(e)
applies where there is an omission of gross income paid to nonresident
aliens that exceeds 25 % of amount shown on Form 1042.
F. Miscellaneous
1. Innocent Spouse
a. McGee v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 66, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,015
(5th Cir. 12/15/92) (per curiam). Affirms (on clear error
standard) Mlix Court's denial of innocent spouse relief under
§ 66(c) to dentist's wife who knew of husband's irresponsible
behavior in financial matters but made no effort to ascertain
amount earned in the dental practice or whether tax returns were
timely filed, so finding that taxpayer knew or should have known
of the item of community income was not erroneous. Penalties for
§ 665 1(a)(1) failure to file [under United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S.
24, 85-1 U.S.T.C. 13,602 (U.S. 1985)] and for former
§ 6653(a) negligence were affirmed under the clear error standard.
b. Havman v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,272 (2d Cir.
5/4/93). Innocent spouse treatment denied to wife of tax shelter
promoter who invested in various tax shelters with her husband.
The wife failed to receive innocent spouse treatment because:
(1) the deductions were attributable to both spouses, and not
merely to the husband; (2) with respect to the "lack of knowledge
requirement" of § 6013(e)(3), the court followed the Price v.
Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 89-2 U.S.T.C. 9598 (9th Cir.
1989), standard of whether "a reasonably prudent taxpayer in her
position at the time she signed the return could be expected to
know that the return contained the substantial understatement," but
found that she was aware of the large deductions (which sufficed
to put her on notice) and "ignorance of the law" was not a
defense; (3) on balancing the equities, the wife was in no way
misled or deceived by her husband or their accountant.
c. Bokum v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,342 (11th Cir.
6/4/93). lhxpayers failed to show they detrimentally relied upon
an erroneous IERS statement that the statute of limitations had run
on the Commissioner's right to challenge their 1971 tax return that
took a tax shelter deduction, so (using its authority to entertain
equitable estoppel claims) the Thx Court found the Commissioner
not to be estopped. Innocent spouse treatment under § 6013(e)
was denied because the deduction was not "grossly erroneous" in
light of the Tax Court having found a similar deduction to be valid
in Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491 (1979), rev'd, 692
E2d 152, 82-2 U.S.T.C. 9626 (1st Cir. 1982).
d. Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,509 (9th Cir.
9/2/93). Innocent spouse relief granted despite spouse's
knowledge of household expenses.
2. Shore v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 829, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,495 (Cl. Ct.
8/21/92). Claims Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on a refund
claim because of taxpayers' failure to pay assessed interest and penalties
before filing their claim. The court refused to follow three of its recent
cases to the contrary (Katz v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 714, 91-1
U.S.T.C. 50,289 (1991); Mac v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 511, 92-1
U.S.T.C. 50,063 (1991); and Cohen v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 717,
91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,384 (1991)) on the interpretation of the rule of Flora
v. United States, 357 U.S. 63,58-2 U.S.T.C. 9606 (1958).
3. Rink v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 20 (4/7/93). Closing agreement
held to support IRS position where taxpayer was an experienced attorney
who withheld important information from the IRS during the negotiation
of that agreement.
4. Proposed regulations (IA-20-92), relating to Circular 230 rules of
practice before the IRS (F.R. 10/8/92). Withdraws 1986 proposed
amendments. Practitioner may not advise client to take a return position
unless either (1) it is supported under the 1 in 3 "realistic possibility
standard," or (2) it is a disclosed nonfrivolous position; support for the
position must come from "approved" sources. No contingent fees unless
litigation expected. Attorneys and CPAs may become enrolled agents.
See also, final regulations relating to advertising and solicitation by
practitioners before the IRS (9/8/92).
5. Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 93-1 U.S.TC.
50,279 (5th Cir. 4/9/93), (per curiam 11-3) on rehearing en banc of 964
F2d 1556, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,443 (5th Cir. 6/25/92), aff'g. in part and
rev'g in part 702 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Tex. 1988). Panel decision:
'Jhxpayers had standing to challenge the "rifle shot" transition rules of the
Mm Reform Act of 1986 which gave relief to others who were "similarly
situated," but which did not give relief to taxpayers. The transition rules
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because there was a rational
basis for Congress to have given relief to those taxpayers who petitioned
Congress and most convincingly demonstrated that they relied on the old
tax laws in making major investment decisions. (The court noted that
taxpayers had not sought transitional relief from Congress.) En banc
decision: "I.xpayers did not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of transitional rules favoring other taxpayers.
6. Rev. Proc. 92-85, 1992-42 I.R.B. 32 (10/1/92). Revised standards that
IRS will use to determine whether to grant an extension to make an
election under Reg. § 301.9100-1. Provides (a) an automatic 12-month
extension for certain elections, (b) an automatic 6-month extension for
certain elections prescribed by the Code to be made by the due date of the
return (or the due date of the return including extensions), and (c) for
other extensions where taxpayer acted reasonably and in good faith, and
the government would not be prejudiced.
7. Charter Co. v. United States, 971 F.2d 1576, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,500
(11th Cir. 9/15/92) (2-1). Mhxpayer entitled to use a barred claim for the
sole purpose of countering the IRS's offset against taxpayer's timely
claim.
8. Day v. Commissioner, 975 F.2d 534, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,472 (8th Cir.
9/17/92). The Commissioner made more than a "naked assessment" in
her determination that taxpayers omitted income from their massage parlor
businesses. The statutory notice was accorded a presumption of
correctness because it was based on a showing that records were kept on
"door money," but not on "back room money" paid by the masseuses for
the use of the back rooms, and the Commissioner showed a link between
the taxpayers and the tax-generating income. Remanded for a
determination of the innocent spouse issue.
9. Rev. Rul. 92-96, 1992-45 I.R.B. 22. Amounts of $600 or more retained
by licensed lottery ticket sales agents are treated as commissions paid by
the state lottery for § 6041 information reporting purposes. However, no
information return is required if the licensee is a corporation, Reg.
§ 1.6041-3(c).
10. Rev. Proc. 92-90, 1992-46 I.R.B. 30. Reduces IRS user fees for rulings
in situations where taxpayer requests substantially identical rulings with
respect to multiple entities.
11. Harper v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 28 (10/29/92) (reviewed).
Course of conduct of petitioner's attorney in failing to comply with
discovery requests, court's orders compelling document production,
court's pretrial standing order to stipulate facts and submit trial
memorandum, and requirement of readiness to prosecute properly resulted
in: (1) dismissal for failure to prosecute properly under Rule 123(b), and
(2) attorney's personal liability under § 6673(a)(2) for $7,400 (74 hours
at $100 per hour) of excessive costs.
12. Real Property Tax Reporting
a. The Comprehensive National Energy Poicy Act of 1992 (Pub.
L. No. 102-486) requires information return reporting of the
amount of real property taxes treated under § 164(d)(1)(B) as
imposed on the purchaser of a residence. Act § 1939, Code
§ 6045(e)(4), effective for transactions after 12/31/92.
b. The Comprehensive National Ener-v Plicv Act of 1992 (Pub.
L. No. 102-486) requires that both buyer and seller in
seller-financed sales of residences report the other's name and
taxpayer's identification number with respect to interest paid and
received. Act § 1933, Code § 6109, applies to taxable years
beginning after 12/31/91.
c. Announcement 92-164, 1992-47 I.R.B. Ill. Provides for
reporting on Form 1099-5 (pursuant to § 6045(e)), with respect to
the seller of a residence, any real property tax treated as imposed
on the purchaser. Notice 93-4, 1993-4 I.R.B. 7 (1/11/93).
Reporting requirement under § 6045(e)(4) (as amended by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992) for real estate brokers to reflect on
revised Form 1099-5 portion of any real property tax that is
allocable to a residential purchaser under § 164(d)(1)(B).
d. IA-17-90, proposed regulations, setting forth the § 6050H
reporting requirements for recipients of points paid on residential
mortgages (implementing 1989 Amendments to § 6050H) (ER.
12/31/92).
13. InverWorld, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 868, 92-2 U.S.T.C.
1 50,594 (D.C. Cir. 11/24/92). Affirms "hx Court's denial of corporate
taxpayer's motion to amend its original petition to redetermine withholding
tax liabilities to permit Thx Court to consider almost $800 million of
income tax deficiencies because the original petition contained no objective
indication of an intent to contest the income tax deficiencies, i.e., no
mention of amount of deficiency assessed, amount contested and years in
dispute.
14. L&U
a. GL-709-88, proposed regulations under § 6331, relating to the
collection of tax by means of levy (ER. 12/11/92).
b. T.D. 8466, final regulations under § 6332, relating to the 21-day
period before a bank may surrender property subject to levy
(12/31/92).
c. T.D. 8467, final regulations under § 6332, regarding the
consequences of honoring an IRS levy (1/11/93).
15. Disclosure of Thx Return Information
a. Barrett v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,291 (S.D. Tex.
4/1/93), on remand from 5th Circuit, 795 F.2d 446, 86-2
U.S.T.C. 9571 (1986). Doctor not entitled to damages under
§ 7431 for § 6103 return information disclosures by the IRS
because the disclosures to the doctor's patients were "necessary"
to obtain information which was not "otherwise reasonably
available."
b. Johnson v. Sawyer, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,065 (5th Cir. 12/29/92)
(2- 1), aff g. modifying. rendering and remanding 91-2 U.S.T.C.
50,302 (S.D. Tex. 1991). IRS press release following Johnson's
guilty plea to tax evasion violated § 6103 and constituted
negligence per se under Texas law, so recovery of damages against
the United States under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was
proper. The action was not preempted by former § 7217, nor by
the tax assessment and collection exception to the FCA. The
§ 6103 violations resulted in the guilty plea becoming a matter of
public knowledge by adding to the information in the court record
such additional information as Johnson's middle initial, his age, his
home address and his official job title. Remanded for
recomputation of the $10 million plus damages. Dissent on the
ground that IRS violations of § 6103 did not give rise to a cause
of action under FTCA and did not in any event cause Johnson's
damage. Neither majority nor dissent relied upon an agreement
that the U.S. Attorney's office would not issue a press release on
the conviction.
C. Mallas v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,302 (4th Cir.
5/20/93). Damages under § 7431 awarded to "investment
counselor" [tax shelter promoter] for disclosure of promoter's tax
return information by sending 73 investors a revenue agent report
setting forth the promoter's criminal conviction [without stating
that the conviction was reversed] and disallowing the investors'
deductions. The audits were held not to be "administrative
proceedings," in which dissemination is allowed by
§ 6103(h)(4)(C); that the information disclosed was a matter of
public record and was non-confidential was held irrelevant.
Remanded for possible award of punitive damages in the event of
a determination that IRS acted willfully or with gross negligence.
16. Weiner v. IRS, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,024 (2d Cir. 1/25/93) (per curiam),
_ffg, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,075 (S.D.N.Y. 5/1/92). The court held that
taxpayer has no remedy for three erroneous and improper levies due to
IRS "computer error." The court found that computer error by IRS
employees did not amount to knowing or negligent disclosure of
confidential tax return information under § 7431. There is no legal remedy
for IRS employees' failure to apologize, explain, or deal with her
courteously.
17. Hearne v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,334 (W.D. Tx. 4/30/93).
Tlxpayers not entitled to deduct ranch expenses for lack of a profit
motive, where their only income from the ranch was a nominal fee for
grazing purposes. The IRS's reexamination of two years' tax returns was
upheld -- even though the parties had already settled on an agreed tax
liability for those years -- because the settlement did not qualify as a
closing agreement. Taxpayers' action for § 7433 civil damages failed
because they had not exhausted all administrative remedies. The court
commented:
Notwithstanding the dismissal of the Hearnes' causes of
action under 26 U.S.C. § 7433, the Court is constrained to
make some observations regarding the evidence in this
case. The IRS' conduct was repugnant and is unacceptable
behavior from a United States governmental agency. It is
clear beyond doubt the IRS and its personnel acted
unprofessionally toward the Hearnes who were, and are,
American taxpayers -- good taxpayers too, who pay
substantial amounts each year. There is no excuse for the
length of time taken to conduct the 1985 audit or the ones
that followed. There is also no excuse for the IRS to offer,
after 11 months of evaluation, a proposed settled -- a
settlement approved by a supervisor -- and then repudiate
the offer and reverse the past year's "ground rules" a
month later. The dates of notification of each additional
audit correspond to the Hearnes' protests and the defensive
actions taken by the Hearnes. The timing and conduct of
the IRS at the very least suggests an abuse of authority as
do the ex parte communications between Schampers
(district) and the Appeals Division. The Hearnes, and all
taxpayers, deserved better treatment than the Hearnes
received.
In this case, the IRS picked on the wrong person who they
incorrectly presumed to be a patsy. Douglass Hearne is a
trained/experienced lawyer who knew his rights and
refused to be run over by the unnamed IRS employees.
The great majority of taxpayers simply have to take such
abusive conduct without recourse, because they simply
cannot afford or do not know how to protect themselves.
Hearne sought and obtained the information he thought he
needed and has succeeded in bringing "he questionable
conduct to public light. It is clear the IRS and its agents
treated the Hearnes unfairly and acted unprofessionally, but
the Court can only offer the Hearnes its condolences and
sympathy. While the Hearnes do not benefit from their
suit, the Court hopes the IRS employees will become
knowledgeable of this case and conduct themselves
according to their positions of trust as public servants
representing our country and its taxpayers, both large and
small.
A take nothing judgment will be entered consistent with
this opinion.
18. Anthony v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,140 (10th Cir. 3/3/93).
The "final civil settlement" of a $32,000 deficiency for $15,000 by
compromise while suit was pending in Tax Court did not entitle IRS to
recover an additional $19,000 in interest in light of taxpayers' repeated
receipt of assurances from the government that the settlement would cover
their "entire civil liability." Attorney's fees awarded to taxpayers.
19. Hagaman v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 12 (3/15/93). Transferee of
furniture, jewelry, furs, a residence, cash and stock, valued at $263,000,
is subject to assessment under § 6901(a) based upon her liability under
both Tennessee and Florida law (as recipient of voluntary transfers that
hindered collection) despite Commissioner's failure to show that transferor
was insolvent at the time of, or immediately after, the transfers. The
court followed Commissioner v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39, 58-2 U.S.T.C.
9594 (1958), which held that § 6901(a) merely provides a procedure
through which taxes may be collected if a basis exists under applicable
state law or equity for holding the transferee liable.
20. United States v. McDermott, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,164 (U.S. 3/24/93) (6-
3), rev'g and remanding 945 F.2d 1475, 91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,491 (10th
Cir. 1991). Federal tax lien filed before delinquent taxpayer acquired real
property is given priority with respect to that real property, over a private
creditor's previously filed judgment lien. Section 6323(a) gives the tax
lien priority from the time notice was filed, while the private creditor's
lien did not attach until the property was acquired.
21. Lewis v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,218 (Bankt W.D. Tenn.
12/28/92). Entertainer's federal income tax liabilities were not discharged
in bankruptcy because his evasive conduct towards the collecting revenue
officer over a period of years constituted a willful attempt to defeat the
payment of taxes, which constitutes an exception to discharge under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).
22. Aronsohn v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,157 (3d Cir. 3/17/93),
_ffg, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,452 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Taxpayers were
equitably estopped by their CPAs execution (pursuant to a Form 2848
Power of Attorney) of a Form 870-AD containing an explicit preclusion
of refund claims for years covered under the settlement.
23. T.D. 8469, final regulations under § 7605, describing the criteria to be
utilized by IRS employees in setting a time and place of examination
(4/2/93). No change was made to the proposed and temporary regulations
provision that the business location of taxpayer's representative generally
will not be considered in determining the place of examination because
qualified local representatives are generally available to taxpayers.
24. AOD No. 1993-1, 1993-22 I.R.B. 4. Acquiesces in McGraw-Hill, Inc. v.
United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. 50,053 (S.D. N.Y. 1990), insofar as it
held taxpayer not to be estopped from seeking a refund attributable to an
item that was unrelated to the issues settled in a Form 870-A.D.
25. Ann. 93-82, 1993-22 I.R.B. 31. The Internal Revenue Bulletin will be
published semimonthly from June through September 1993 because of
budget constraints.
26. T.D. 8479, final amendments to regulations under § 60501, relating to the
reporting requirement for trades or businesses receiving multiple cash
payments totalling more than $10,000 within any 12-month period with
respect to the same transaction or a related transaction (6/18/93).
27. Cohen v. United States, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,354 (Fed. Cir. 6/4/93).
Taxpayer entitled to a refund of funds remitted to the IRS in response to
a 90-day letter when the IRS failed to assess the deficiency before the
expiration of the statute of limitations.
28. Hudson v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 37 (6/23/93). There is no
collateral estoppel where a trial court's judgment in an earlier proceeding
was affirmed by an appellate court on grounds different from those relied
upon by the trial court (and the appellate court did not pass on the trial
court's conclusions of law or findings of fact).
29. 1993 Act §13252 requires information reporting by financial institutions
under new Code §6050P, effective 1/1/94. See, Notice 93-52, 1993-34
I.R.B. 1, for rules for reporting such income.
30. Godfrey v. United States, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,384 (7th Cir. 6/28/93).
IRS was required to pay interest when taxpayers did not receive their
original income tax refund check and the replacement check was received
four months late.
31. 1993 Act §13271 amends Code §6611(e) by expanding the category of tax
returns for which the IRS does not have to pay interest if a refund is
issued by the 45th day, effective for returns to be filed on or after 1/1/94.
XII. Tax Shelters
A. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 350, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,350 (9th Cir.
6/26/92). Interest accrued on 30-year balloon nonrecourse debt incurred to
purchase overvalued timeshare units was not deductible because the transaction
was a sham. Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92, 91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,517
(5th Cir. 1991), followed.
B. Estate of Wallace v. Commissioner, 965 F.2d 1038, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,387
(11th Cir. 7/13/92). Physician involved in cattle feeding business (in commercial
feedlots) could not deduct the cost of prepaid cattle feed in the year purchased
because under § 464 he was a "limited entrepreneur" who did not "actively
participate" in the management of the cattle-feeding enterprise, i.e., he had no
control over how the commercial feedlots were operated.
C. Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132 (7/29/92). Enhanced oil recovery limited
partnership activities were not engaged in with actual and honest profit objectives.
D. Lombardo v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 19 (9/28/92). Thxpayers failed to
show that Commissioner's determination was based upon a matter before the
grand jury, and subject to the Rule 6(e) [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]
secrecy requirement.
E. Waters v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1310, 92-2 U.S.T.C. 50,547 (2d Cir.
10/21/92). Mnbxpayer was not at risk with respect to a nominally recourse note
executed in connection with a non-sham computer leasing transaction because
taxpayer was protected from loss under § 465(b)(4) and there was no realistic
possibility he would suffer economic loss. The court held that a theoretical
possibility of suffering economic loss is insufficient to avoid applicability of
§ 465(b)(4).
F. Peat Oil & Gas Associates v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. No. 17 (3/31/93)
(reviewed). Synthetic fuel tax shelters were generic tax shelters because any
economic benefit to taxpayers/limited partners was precluded. The concurring
opinions denied the deductions but, in view of the Sixth Circuit opinions in
Rose v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 851, 89-1 U.S.T.C. 9191 (1989), and
Smith v. Commissioner, 937 F2d 1089 (1991), would not follow the generic tax
shelter analysis.
G. Pasternak v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,226 (6th Cir. 4/8/93).
Investments in master sound recording leasing activities were shams, lacking in
economic substance or profit motive. Negligence, valuation overstatement and
(increased rate of interest for substantial underpayments attributable to)
"tax-motivated transactions" penalties were upheld.
H. Bailey v. Commissioner, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 50,237 (2nd Cir. 4/20/93).
Partnership's nonrecourse notes used to purchase rights from a motion picture
company for a share of the motion pictures' earnings were not genuine debt, so
depreciation on interest deductions were disallowed. The Second Cir. affirmed
the Mix Court finding that, because partnership's contract rights were "worth no
more than 48-56 % of the face value of the corresponding nonrecourse note," the
nonrecourse noters should not be regarded as part of the purchase price of the
contract rights.
Kantor v. Commissioner, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 150,433 (9th Cir. 7/20/93), affg and
reg T.C. Memo. 1990-380. Amounts paid by limited partnership to another
firm to research and develop computer software, where that other firm had the
opportunity to obtain for a nominal sum the exclusive right to market the
technology, were not deductible under §174 because the limited partnership was
not in a trade or business of its own. Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500
(1974), distinguished because the partnership here did not demonstrate a "realistic
prospect" of entering into its own business if the research was successful, because
§174 does contain a "trade or business" requirement. Imposition of the new
negligence penalty was reversed because taxpayers (limited partners) had "few,
if any, warning signals that they would not have been entitled to the [§174]
deduction" at the time they invested in the partnership.
